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Real Masks and Real Name Policies: 
Applying Anti-Mask Case Law to 
Anonymous Online Speech 
Margot Kaminski*  
 
The First Amendment protects anonymous speech, but the 
scope of that protection has been the subject of much debate.  This 
Article adds to the discussion of anonymous speech by examining 
anti-mask statutes and cases as an analogue for the regulation of 
anonymous speech online.  Anti-mask case law answers a number 
of questions left open by the Supreme Court.  It shows that courts 
have used the First Amendment to protect anonymity beyond core 
political speech, when mask-wearing is expressive conduct or 
shows a nexus with free expression.  This Article explores what the 
anti-mask cases teach us about anonymity online, including 
proposed real-name policies.  It closes by returning to the real 
world of real masks, addressing the significance of physical 
anonymity in an age of remote biometric identification and drone 
use. 
  
 
*  Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School and Executive Director of the Information 
Society Project at Yale Law School.  Many thanks to M. Ryan Calo, Bryan H. Choi, A. 
Michael Froomkin, Chris Hoofnagle, and other workshop participants at the 2012 Privacy 
Law Scholars Conference (PLSC) for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Anonymity can be a shield against the tyranny of the majority, 
or a mask used to protect the perpetrator of a crime.1  The Supreme 
Court has held that the First Amendment protects anonymous 
speech.2  In recent years, however, lower courts have recognized 
how challenging it is to protect an unqualified right to anonymous 
expression when anonymity is used by the perpetrators of legal 
harms.  Courts have converged on a standard for a more qualified 
right to anonymity online.3  Most scholarly discussion of 
anonymity focuses on this recently developed John Doe subpoena 
standard.  But courts addressed the puzzle of anonymity’s 
relationship to speech prior to the Doe standard.  States enacted 
anti-mask statutes as early as 1845, and various courts have 
evaluated those statutes under the First Amendment since the 
1960s.4  This Article examines how courts have treated anti-mask 
statutes, and compares that treatment to the Doe standard and 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on anonymity.  Anti-mask case law 
and Doe case law turn out to inform each other in fascinating 
ways. 
The core puzzle of anonymity is also its core value: anonymity 
protects speakers from both social stigma and legal enforcement.  
In a repressive regime, anonymity allows dissidents to protest 
against the government without fear of arrest, or worse.  In a 
 
 1 McIntyre v. Ohio, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (observing that anonymity can “protect 
unpopular individuals from retaliation . . . at the hand of an intolerant society” and 
provide a “shield from the tyranny of the majority”). But see A. Michael Froomkin, 
Anonymity and its Enmities, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 4, ¶¶ 44–46 (1995), available at 
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/classes/6.805/articles/anonymity/froomkin.html 
[hereinafter Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities]. 
 2 See generally McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 334 (holding that “the freedom to publish 
anonymously is protected by the First Amendment”). 
 3 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn from John 
Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1373, 1378 (2009) (describing the converging Doe standards 
employed by lower courts).  
 4 See People v. Aboaf, 187 Misc. 2d 173, 183, 721 N.Y.S.2d 725, 733 (Crim. Ct. 
2001) (discussing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(4) (LexisNexis 2012)) (observing that an 
early 1845 New York anti-mask law arose out of demonstrations and riots by anti-rent 
protestors disguised as Indians); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); see, e.g., 
Schumann v. State of New York, 270 F. Supp. 730, 731–32 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); see also 
Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 94 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Ghafari v. Mun. Court, 87 Cal. 
App. 3d 255, 259 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). 
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democracy, anonymity allows authors to be judged on the merits of 
their words alone, and whistleblowers to come forward without 
fear of getting fired.  But to a government, anonymity can be 
coterminous with untraceability, preventing perpetrators from 
being discovered and laws from being enforced.5  And to an online 
publisher, anonymity can encourage nasty online comments 
unchecked by social feedback or social consequences. 
Can the government impose a blanket ban on anonymity to 
thwart the masked and uncatchable bank robber, at the expense of 
the mask-wearing protester?  The answer to this question has 
consequences in both the real world and the world online.  The 
proliferation of both online trolls and offline revolutionaries has 
led governments around the world to adopt online real-name 
policies, where individuals are required to register their real 
identity with their Internet Service Provider (ISP) or Online 
Service Provider (OSP), or receive a state-assigned identity 
number.6  Scholars have called for a similar registration regime in 
the United States,7 and legislation requiring online identification 
was recently proposed in New York.8  This Article addresses 
whether such a regime would be constitutional under the First 
Amendment.  I conclude, based on anti-mask case law, that it 
would not be constitutional, due to the overbreadth of such a 
statute and the chilling of a great deal of protected speech.  A 
blanket real-world ban on anonymity similarly chills protected 
expression; and physical anonymity is becoming increasingly 
important in today’s surveillance society.9 
 
 5 Bryan H. Choi, The Anonymous Internet, 72 MD. L. REV. 501 (forthcoming), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2005941. 
 6 See e.g., Choi, supra note 5, at 534 (discussing how China and South Korea have 
been at the forefront of imposing “real name” requirements).  
 7 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 67 (2009); 
Choi, supra note 5, at 531–32. 
 8 Chenda Ngak, New York Lawmakers Propose Ban on Anonymous Online 
Comments, CBS NEWS (May 24, 2012, 11:46 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
501465_162-57440895-501465/new-york-lawmakers-propose-ban-on-anonymous-
online-comments.  
 9 See Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional 
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 425 (2012) 
(outlining the development of federal biometric and facial identification programs). 
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A related and equally important question is when, precisely, 
unidentifiability ceases to be an instrument and becomes protected 
speech.  We do not give First Amendment protection to the person 
who chooses not to put a license plate on her car, so when do we 
give protection to the person wearing a mask?  The Doe 
scholarship and cases fail to address this question, because the 
online anonymity they address is inextricably intertwined with 
speech.  When you make a comment online under a pseudonym, 
you have at some point written down that pseudonym.  Anti-mask 
case law, by contrast, struggles deeply with the dividing line 
between expression and instrumentality, often employing the 
O’Brien test to determine when mask-wearing is symbolic 
speech.10  Perhaps surprisingly, anti-mask case law also shows that 
anonymity can be connected to speech even when it is purely 
functional in nature, because courts recognize that anonymity’s 
functionality can enable expression or association. 
The third question raised by both anti-mask statutes and online 
policies is whether untraceability creates enough of a state interest 
that untraceable anonymity can always be banned.  It turns out that 
in many cases, untraceability is not a concern.  Anonymity usually 
exists on a continuum of traceability.  Often, anonymity or 
pseudonymity creates an extra layer of obscurity, rather than 
enabling true untraceability.11  For example, the Doe defendants 
online are not untraceable; their identities are knowable through 
websites and Internet service providers.  The Doe cases arise 
precisely because the law both creates a mechanism for discovery 
of the Does’ identities, and raises additional hurdles to that 
discovery in the name of free speech.  This continuum of 
traceability exists offline as well.  Masked individuals are not 
untraceable; they are just more difficult to trace, and require the 
use of other kinds of deduction and forensic evidence.  Given the 
 
 10 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 11 For discussion of the related idea of an “obscurity continuum,” see Woodrow 
Hartzog & Frederick Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2013) (“[I]nformation is obscure online if it lacks one or more key factors that are 
essential to discovery or comprehension. We have identified four of these factors: (1) 
search visibility, (2) unprotected access, (3) identification, and (4) clarity . . . .  Courts 
could use an obscurity continuum when determining if certain information is eligible for 
privacy protections.”). 
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legal scholarship’s repeated focus on traceability in online 
anonymous speech, what is perhaps most surprising in the anti-
mask case law is how little of a focus courts place on the state 
interest in traceability. 
This Article begins with a discussion of anonymity and 
pseudonymity, and the relationship between anonymity and 
traceability.  Part II discusses related Supreme Court case law.  
Part III examines anti-mask case law to determine how courts have 
treated government bans of real masks.  Part IV asks whether these 
cases teach us anything about anonymity online, including recently 
proposed real-name policies.  Part V returns to the real world of 
real masks, and addresses the significance of physical anonymity 
in the age of remote biometric identification and aerial drones.  
Part VI connects online anonymity to anti-mask laws more broadly 
speaking, by briefly discussing what the Internet has in common 
with freedom of assembly offline. 
I. ANONYMITY AND ITS FEATURES 
There are different kinds of anonymity.  Some kinds of 
anonymity may be more expressive than others, and some may be 
more dangerous than others.  Online speech arguably permits a 
different kind of anonymity than offline speech.  Online speech 
may be untraceable; that is, the speaker’s identity might never be 
revealed. 
Existing scholarship either concludes that untraceable online 
anonymity is essential to protect dissidents,12 or deplores the fact 
that untraceability enables harms to others.13  One scholar recently 
suggested that online untraceability causes states to restrict the 
development of new technologies as part of law enforcement 
 
 12 See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living 
with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 429 
(1996) (explaining that “[t]he Supreme Court has . . . tended to be highly solicitous of the 
need of dissidents . . . to speak anonymously when they have a credible fear of retaliation 
for what they say”) [hereinafter Froomkin, Flood Control]. 
 13 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 62 (2009) 
(“Social networking sites and blogs have increasingly become breeding grounds for 
anonymous online groups that attack women, people of color, and members of other 
traditionally disadvantaged groups.”). 
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efforts.14  If that is the case, we may have to choose between the 
twin values of anonymity and innovation. 
The difference between types of anonymity leads to open 
questions about First Amendment doctrine: does the Supreme 
Court intend that all anonymity must be equally protected, or does 
some anonymity have less expressive value than others?  Is it 
possible that some anonymity receives less protection under a 
balancing test because it may be inherently more harmful than 
other kinds? 
A. Definition 
There are four types of anonymity, or more accurately, identity 
obfuscation: (1) traceable anonymity, (2) untraceable anonymity, 
(3) traceable pseudonymity, and (4) untraceable pseudonymity.15  
This taxonomy disentangles the audience’s ability to identify the 
author from the author’s choice of whether to self-identify. 
Untraceable anonymity arises when the author or speaker both 
does not identify herself, and is ultimately not identifiable.  This 
form of anonymity is extremely difficult to achieve in the real 
world, due to the increasing prevalence of forensic evidence.  In 
the real world, untraceability is a temporal and effort-based 
concept; one can be truly untraceable only for a period of time, 
until resource expenditure over time eventually reveals one’s 
identity.16  Online, untraceability is more easily achievable, and 
herein lies the appeal of, and justification for, regulation of online 
anonymity for many governments.17  Governments fear that 
complete untraceability will permit the perfect crime.18 
Increasingly, however, most people online are traceable 
through intermediaries or other identifiers.  Traceable anonymity 
creates a temporary experience of anonymity, but leaves 
identifying information in the hands of an intermediary or registry 
 
 14 Choi, supra note 5, at 541 (explaining that “[t]he trouble with using technology to 
elevate anonymity of the law is that it turns the enabling technology into a target”). 
 15 Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 11–40. 
 16 See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as 
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1381 (2000). 
 17 Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 418, 427. 
 18 Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities, note 1, at ¶¶ 44–45. 
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of some sort.  In reality, most anonymous people online are 
traceably anonymous.19  The upcoming switch to IPv6 makes it 
even harder to go untraced online in the absence of deliberately 
deploying anonymizing software like Tor.20 
Traceable anonymity is often advocated as a compromise 
between identity play and societal safety.  In the context of a civil 
lawsuit or criminal investigation, traceable anonymity allows 
plaintiffs to identify an online speaker.  But the problem with 
traceable anonymity is that the online speaker may not be aware 
that she is traceable when she speaks, and in authoritarian regimes 
or with overeager litigants, the consequences can be dire.  This is 
why courts have developed the Doe standard, to prevent misuse of 
the subpoena process through the filing of frivolous lawsuits to 
discover the identity of an anonymous critic. 
One can also be unidentifiable while not being truly 
anonymous, if one adopts a pseudonym.  The difference between 
pseudonymity and anonymity is interesting and under-theorized.  
Pseudonymity allows for the adoption of a developing, ongoing 
identity that can itself develop an image and reputation.21  
Pseudonymous individuals presumably abstain from abusing others 
more than anonymous individuals, because of the importance of 
ongoing reputation in pseudonymous communicative contexts.22  
Or, perversely, pseudonymous individuals may be encouraged to 
abuse others, depending on the type of social reputation that 
matters most to them.23  Pseudonyms can also be adopted by 
 
 19 Citron, supra note 7, at 123–24. 
 20 Duncan B. Hollis, An e-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 399 n.172 
(2011); see also TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org. 
 21 Interview with A. Michael Froomkin, Professor of Law, University of Miami School 
of Law (regarding the Privacy Law Scholars Conference 2012).  Anonymity is more 
appropriate for discrete one-off actions, although it can become clear in the context of 
one conversation that the same person is behind a given stream of comments. Id. 
22     See Jennifer Van Grove, Data Suggests People Using Pseudonyms Leave Better 
Comments, VENTURE BEAT (Jan. 15, 2012), http://venturebeat.com/2012/01/15/ 
pseudonyms-vs-real-names (observing that sixty-one percent of comments made by 
people using pseudonyms showed positive quality signals, compared to thirty-four 
percent from anonymous commenters and fifty-one percent from real name commenters). 
 23 Citron, supra note 7, at 83. 
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numerous people at once, allowing for a shared voice and shared 
identity.24 
Pseudonymity has implications for First Amendment doctrine, 
because it always involves a conscious choice of an alternate 
name.  By contrast, anonymity is sometimes attained through 
passivity, rather than through active speech.  Supreme Court 
doctrine refers to anonymity as an editorial choice, where the 
author chooses to speak a different name, or to not speak at all.25  
However, in anti-mask cases, lower courts’ tendency to view 
anonymity as conduct suggests that the distinction between 
anonymity and pseudonymity might be revisited in online contexts 
where anonymity does not involve words.  Anonymity might be 
seen as conduct, while pseudonymity by virtue of the use of words 
must always be expressive. 
Like anonymity, pseudonymity can be split into two categories: 
traceable and untraceable.  Untraceable pseudonymity occurs when 
an author identifies herself through a pseudonym, but is not 
ultimately identifiable.  Traceable pseudonymity again allows 
somebody to eventually trace the identity of the author.26  From a 
policy perspective, these do not differ measurably from 
untraceable anonymity or traceable anonymity.  From a free-
expression-focused perspective, however, pseudonymity represents 
a conscious choice to “speak” a different name than one’s own. 
B. Is Anonymity Good or Bad? 
Anonymous online speech has received a lot of attention, both 
scholarly and in the popular press, in recent years.  Some argue 
that anonymity is essential to a functioning democracy, allowing 
minorities and whistleblowers to speak without fearing 
repercussion.27  Others point out that anonymity enables nasty 
 
 24 Thanks to Nabiha Syed for identifying this phenomenon.  For an example, the 
popular author “Ellery Queen,” is a joint pseudonym of Daniel Nathan and Manfred 
Lepofsky. See Joyce Carol Oates, Pseudonymous Selves, USF CELESTIAL TIMEPIECE, 
available at http://www.usfca.edu/jco/pseudonyms (last visited Apr. 3, 2013). 
 25 See McIntyre v. Ohio, 514 U.S. 336, 341 (1995). 
 26 Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities, supra note 1, at ¶ 36. 
 27 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and 
Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1574 (2007) (noting that anonymity 
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behavior such as harassment and stalking, with no social 
consequences.28  The issue has been hotly debated in the online 
context because anonymity is a feature of the early Internet that 
has gradually been disappearing as private companies, the forums 
for online communication, turn to real-name policies for business 
and other reasons.29 
Anonymity can promote certain kinds of desirable speech, and 
arguably can increase the total amount of speech.30  It can also, 
however, cloak bad behavior and have other negative effects.31 
Allowing anonymous speech arguably benefits both speakers 
and audience.32  To some, the First Amendment’s goal is to protect 
speakers; to others, the First Amendment provides value to society 
as a whole, through the creation of a vibrant and egalitarian 
marketplace of ideas.33  In this second view, although the First 
Amendment right belongs to the speaker, the value of the speech 
depends on the audience.34  Thus in the following discussion I 
 
engenders the opinions of people, such as the less wealthy and powerful, who might not 
otherwise choose to partake in the public discourse). 
 28 See, e.g., Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: 
Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1642–43 (1995) 
(stating that anonymity results in less civilized and more outrageous behavior); Nathaniel 
Gleicher, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard, 118 YALE L. J. 
320, 324 (2008) (noting that anonymity spurs gossip, defamation, harassment, and 
enables “[f]aceless crowds of online tormentors wield virtual pitchforks, carry virtual 
torches, and hound innocent targets into hiding and out of the online world entirely”). 
 29 Margot Kaminski, Reading Over Your Shoulder: Social Readers and Privacy Law, 2 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 13, 14 (2012) (discussing how Facebook’s and Google’s policy 
that users register with their real names facilitates advertising and encourages civil user 
comments). 
 30 The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 
YALE L.J. 1084, 1112 (1961) (explaining that disclosure may deter speech and 
accordingly inhibit certain ideas from being shared). 
 31 See Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 402 (explaining that anonymous 
communication facilitates engagement in miscreant behavior such as conspiracy, hateful 
speech, electronic stalking, and libel). 
 32 Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1539–40. 
 33 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 143, 176–77 (2010) (contrasting free speech libertarians with free speech 
egalitarians). 
 34 Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1539–40 (demonstrating the concern with the 
speaker and the audience in both a positive and normative analysis of anonymous 
speech). 
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focus first on the value of anonymous speech to speakers, and then 
on the value of anonymous speech to an audience. 
From a speaker’s perspective, anonymity can protect a speaker 
from any costs incurred by speaking, including retaliation and 
social ostracism.35  Because anonymity protects authors from costs, 
it can permit speech that otherwise would be “chilled.”36  As the 
Supreme Court has noted, anonymity can thus empower the 
minority author to speak against the majority opinion.37  This 
protection from costs allows authors to engage in minority political 
speech and “whistle-blowing.”38  Anonymity also provides 
protection for those speakers who are being stalked or harassed, 
allowing them to seek information and counseling without fearing 
the more intimate reprisal from a harasser or an abusive ex-
boyfriend. 
Anonymity can additionally allow an author to obtain collateral 
benefits that could be more costly if his or her identity is known.39  
An author can thus speak about an area entwined with her own 
interests and not fear that the audience will discount the 
information based on the author’s identity.40  This feature of 
anonymity puts authors’ interests in tension with the audience’s 
interests, as the ability to gain collateral benefits might be good for 
the author but bad for the audience.41 
 
 35 Id. at 1568 (referring to two kinds of costs: “Wrongful Retaliation,” a private cost 
that results from speaking truthfully, and “Justifiable Retaliation,” a private cost that 
results from speaking falsely). 
 36 Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation and Discourse in Cyberspace, 48 DUKE L. 
J. 855, 888 (2000) (explaining the chilling effect to be the self-censorship people practice 
to avoid the repercussions of speaking, a result of defamation law) [hereinafter Lidsky, 
Silencing John Doe]. 
 37 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995); Victoria Smith 
Ekstrand, Unmasking Jane and John Doe: Online Anonymity and the First Amendment, 8 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 413 (“[A]nonymous speech protects and advances the minority 
viewpoint, which might otherwise face discrimination.”). 
 38 Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities, supra note 1, at ¶ 7. (“[C]ommunicative 
autonomy allows users to engage in political speech without fear of retribution, to engage 
in whistle-blowing while running a greatly reduced risk of detection.”). 
 39 Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1568. 
 40 Id. at 1575–76.   
 41 Id. at 1540. 
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Anonymity can allow an author to “play,” or experiment with 
identities or ideologies that differ from his or her real identity and 
may differ from the acceptable norm.42  This identity “play” 
includes permitting better known authors to cast aside their social 
and artistic identity and start afresh.43  Anonymity allows a person 
to associate with a particular group or particular religion of which 
others disapprove.44  It allows an author to form a new self or 
engage in a new community.  Historically, pseudonyms may have 
been adopted for class-related reasons, because they allowed a 
gentleman author to compete with “scribblers,” and lower-class 
writers to gain the authority of gentlemen.45 
In addition to external benefits, an anonymous author may 
derive internal satisfaction from speaking without attribution.46  An 
author may specifically wish to escape her previous reputation in 
order to have her message taken seriously.47  Or a particularly 
timorous author may be encouraged to step beyond that timidity 
and take on an authoritative voice.48  An author whose viewpoint 
may be judged based on age, sex, race, or national origin may use 
anonymity to escape bigotry and stereotyping and be judged solely 
on quality of the message.49  To repurpose a comment made about 
 
 42 See id. at 22.  
 43 See Oates, supra note 24. 
 44 NAACP v. Alabama, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 1171–72 (1958) (explaining that privacy in 
one’s associations, be it with a religious faith or political group, is often essential if 
people are to have freedom of association). 
 45 Chesa Boudin, Publius and the Petition: Doe v. Reed and the History of Anonymous 
Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 2140, 2155 n.66 (2011) (explaining that there may also have been 
class-based reasons for the common use of pseudonyms).  Adair suggests “[a] gentleman 
lost caste if he wrote professionally in competition with mere scribblers; and conversely, 
a lower-class professional writer concealed behind a nom de plume could gain authority 
by writing as if he were a gentleman.” Id. (quoting DOUGLASS ADAIR, FAME AND THE 
FOUNDING FATHERS 386 n.1 (Trevor Colbourn ed., Liberty Fund 1998) (1974)). 
 46 Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1568. 
 47 See id. at 1577 (describing what Lidsky and Cotter refer to as “The Boy who Cried 
Wolf” rationale, which occurs from the speaker’s realization that the public will discount 
the speech, and accordingly be harmed, if it knows the source); see also Oates, supra note 
24. 
 48 See Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 408. 
 49 See id. at 409.  
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the Internet, anonymity “not only removes barriers to speaking; it 
also removes barriers to being heard.”50 
From an audience’s perspective, anonymity can increase the 
amount of speech, which at a minimum allows for greater variety 
in the marketplace of ideas.51  Anonymity can allow for the 
distribution of particularly valuable speech that otherwise would 
not be made, such as when whistleblowers and other less powerful 
individuals speak up against the status quo and provide useful 
information.52  Anonymity can also benefit the audience by 
preventing it from judging an idea based on the identity or 
background of a particular author, when that identity would 
unfairly bias the audience against the author’s point of view.53 
Anonymity allows for more uninhibited information-seeking.54  
Although this feature technically concerns authors rather than 
audiences, it is at an intersection with audience interests because 
the authors become audience members as they ask for 
information.55  Anonymity allows individuals to seek answers to 
private or semi-private embarrassing questions.56  This allows 
them to avoid shame or embarrassment, a fear distinct from 
 
 50 Lidsky, Silencing John Doe, supra note 36, at 895. 
 51 Choi, supra note 5, at 524–25 (describing this as a macroeconomic benefit to the 
marketplace of ideas). 
 52 See id. 
 53 See id. (“[I]n a microeconomic sense, an individual idea becomes more competitive 
within the existing market when identifying information is withheld, because readers are 
forced to judge it on its merits without being biased by the identity or background of the 
author.”); see also Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1577 (describing the “Boy Who 
Cried Wolf” feature of anonymity). 
 54 See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1574. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See, e.g., Ekstrand, supra note 37, at 413 (explaining that anonymity protects private 
information); Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 576, 578 (N.D. Cal. 
1999) (“[I]t permits persons to obtain information relevant to a sensitive or intimate 
condition without fear or embarrassment.”); Ekstrand, supra note 37, at 413 (explaining 
that anonymity protects private information); Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities, 
supra note 1, at ¶ 7 (“[C]ommunicative anonymity allows users . . . to seek advice about 
embarrassing personal problems without fear of discovery.”); Froomkin, Flood Control, 
supra note 12, at 408 (“Communicative anonymity encourages people to post requests for 
information to public bulletin boards about matters they may find too personal to discuss 
if there were any chance that the message might be traced back to its origin.”). 
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retaliation.57  The protection of potentially shameful information-
seeking may in turn have larger positive benefits for society, 
including the enhancement of public health.58 
Allowing anonymous speech, however, also allows for harms, 
from both an author’s and an audience’s perspective.59  Anonymity 
can have a “disinhibiting effect,” separating the speaker from the 
immediate consequences of her speech.60  This can cause an author 
to feel safer from consequences than she actually is.61  That same 
disinhibiting effect can lead to the spread of gossip, defamation, 
and harassment.62 
The anonymity of some authors may in fact prevent the speech 
of other authors.63  Online harassment by a group can subjugate 
and drown out the minority voice, potentially chilling more speech 
than it generates.64  This has led one scholar to call for an 
assessment of the Doe standard under the public figure doctrine, 
with an eye towards how effectively the target of harassing speech 
can protect himself in a public forum.65  Anonymity is not just a 
shield against the tyranny of the majority; it can also “enable[] a 
majority to terrorize the few.”66 
Anonymous speech may be less valuable to its audience from 
an informational standpoint than named speech; the audience 
receives no information about speaker identity and thus must rely 
 
 57 Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1568, 1572 (comparing authors’ motivation to 
maintain anonymity due to a concern about ensuing that authors may want to prevent 
“shame, humiliation, or social ostracism” with those who are concerned about 
retaliation).  
 58 Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 408–09. 
 59 Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1539 (noting that authors of anonymous speech 
are more likely to be disregarded and audiences of anonymous speech are more likely to 
be harmed by the tortuous or deleterious speech). 
 60 Id. at 1575. 
 61 See id. 
 62 Id. (“Since the Internet magnifies the number of anonymous speakers, it also 
magnifies the likelihood of false and abusive speech.”). 
 63 Gleicher, supra note 28, at 324–25. 
 64 Id. at 325 (“[A]nonymous harassing speech may reduce, rather than enhance, the 
amount and quality of online speech.”). 
 65 See id. at 334. 
 66 Id. at 324. 
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upon other indicia of reliability.67  Anonymity can thus give rise to 
unverifiable speech.68  It can make it more difficult for an audience 
“to identify the self interest or bias underlying an argument.”69  
Transparency and anonymity can be competing values.  The 
Supreme Court has recognized this tension, and seems to have 
recognized that in the electoral context, transparency should trump 
anonymity.70 
As mentioned, the most significant feature of anonymity from a 
law enforcement perspective is that anonymity is in general “a 
great tool for evading detection of illegal and immoral activity,” 
which can lead to the proliferation of both illegal and immoral 
speech as the disincentive structure changes.71  “Hate-speech” and 
“general nastiness,” in addition to illegal activity “become lower-
risk activities if conducted via anonymous communications.”72  
When anonymity is used to perform illegal acts, it gets in the way 
of the enforcement of rules that could otherwise benefit society.73  
Completely untraceable anonymity can allow for the “perfect 
crime[].”74  A government that cannot regulate anonymity may 
instead regulate technology, with bad collateral effects on 
innovative platforms.75 
Thus from an audience perspective, even if there is more 
speech, that increase in speech might be “bad.”76  As Robert Post 
has observed, certain restrictions on speech, such as defamation 
 
 67 Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1559. 
 68 Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 403; Lidsky, Silencing John Doe, supra 
note 36, at 862–63. 
 69 Id. (quoting Note, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure 
and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084, 1111 (1961)). 
 70 Boudin, supra note 45, at 2172. 
 71 Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 402–03. 
 72 Id. at 402. 
 73 See, e.g., Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 404 (“Anonymous 
communication . . . poses particularly stark enforcement problems for libel law and 
intellectual property law.”). 
 74 Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities, supra note 1, at ¶ 44. 
 75 Choi, supra note 5, at 520–22.   
 76 Id. at 403; see also Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1556 (noting that anonymity 
can be seen as “bad” because of the number of speakers abusing this right). 
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law, can help make meaningful discourse possible, in addition to 
protecting dignitary interests.77 
Finally, just as anonymity can be intrinsically valuable, it can 
also be intrinsically harmful.78  In anti-mask cases, anonymity is 
often seen as inherently threatening.79  This arises in the context of 
the long line of historical intimidation using masks by the Ku Klux 
Klan.80  But it is also articulated in broader terms.81  Masks and 
lack of identity can be inherently frightening.82  The discomfort of 
an audience, however, is not an adequate policy reason—or an 
adequate reason under the First Amendment—for banning 
anonymity. 
C. Should Anonymity be Banned? 
Despite these dangers, a number of factors weigh in the favor 
of protecting anonymous speech.  Attempts to regulate against 
harmful anonymity are often overbroad, and create collateral 
censorship of perfectly legitimate speech.83  The First Amendment 
requires “breathing space” for protected speech to flourish, even if 
that means incurring harms.84 
Blanket identity registration requirements change the nature of 
speech by deterring spontaneous anonymous speech.  This 
 
 77 Lidsky, Silencing John Doe, supra note 36, at 886 (citing Robert C. Post, The Social 
Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 
713 (1986)). 
 78 Ekstrand, supra note 37, at 407. 
 79 See, e.g., Choi, supra note 5, at 538–39 (stating that in cases dealing with the KKK 
and Communist Party, anonymity was not appropriate because the groups’ messages and 
actions were too perilous). 
 80 See, e.g., id. at 38, n.196 (citing Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. 
Kerik, 356 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004). See generally Hernandez v. Superintendent, 800 F. 
Supp. 1344 (E.D. Va. 1992)). 
 81 See, e.g., Choi, supra note 5, at 538, n.197 (citing Communist Party of the U.S. v. 
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 
U.S. 109, 126 (1959)). 
 82 NAACP v. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 465 (1958) (noting that certain mask groups 
such as the KKK committed “acts of unlawful intimidation”). 
 83 Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 402 (“Some . . . argue . . . the harms 
(e.g., censorship) associated with trying to ban anonymity are not worth any benefits that 
could ensue.”). 
 84 Id.  
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rationale has come up at least twice in Supreme Court case law.85  
In Thomas v. Collins, for example, the Supreme Court found that 
registration requirements were “incompatible” with the First 
Amendment.86  In Watchtower Bible, the Court feared that 
upholding a registration requirement for door-to-door 
noncommercial solicitation would prevent neighbors from going to 
each other’s houses to talk.87  Spontaneity thus has its own First 
Amendment value that is implicated in discussions of anonymity 
and identity registration requirements.88 
Historical tradition also suggests that we afford strong 
protections for anonymity.  The United States has a recognized 
tradition of anonymous pamphleteering.89  This national history 
was a driving force behind the Supreme Court’s decisions in Talley 
and McIntyre,90 with one scholar noting that “[a]nonymous 
publications have profoundly shaped American history going back 
to the colonial era.”91 
The United States also has a historical preference for more 
speech rather than less, and protecting anonymity would be in 
keeping with this tradition as well.  The First Amendment assumes 
that audiences are capable of rationally assessing the 
characteristics of speech, and assumes that more speech is 
generally preferable to less.92  The truth is best gathered “out of a 
multitude of tongues.”93 
 
 85 See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 539 (1945) (stating that “a requirement of 
registration in order to make a public speech would seem generally incompatible with an 
exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly”); see also Watchtower Bible v. 
Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165–66 (2002) (stating that “[i]t is offensive . . . to the 
very notion of a free society that . . . a citizen must first inform the government of [their] 
desire to speak to [their] neighbors and then obtain a permit”). 
 86 Thomas, 323 U.S. at 540. 
 87 See Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 165–66. 
 88 See id. 
 89 See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960); see also McIntyre v. Ohio, 514 
U.S. 334, 360 (1995). 
 90 Jocelyn Hanamirian, The Right to Remain Anonymous: Anonymous Speakers, 
Confidential Sources and the Public Good, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 119, 123 n.24 (2011). 
 91 See Boudin, supra note 45, at 2152. 
 92 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First 
Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 810–11.  
 93 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff’d, 326 
U.S. 1 (1945)). 
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Anonymity is, at its foundation, about power.  Mandating the 
retention of identity information puts a great deal of power in the 
hands of the government.  It makes it difficult for individuals to 
speak out about unpopular issues, especially issues that are 
unpopular to the government.94  Attacking or punishing the tools 
that provide anonymity, whether online tools such as Tor or real-
world tools such as masks, is an overbroad measure, and 
exacerbates a fundamental imbalance of power between 
individuals and their government.95 
As A. Michael Froomkin has pointed out, “the debate about 
anonymity . . . is in effect a debate about the degree of political and 
economic freedom that will be fostered, or tolerated, in a modern 
society.”96  Given how few individuals are actually untraceable 
both offline and online—most people register information with 
third parties such as their ISPs, and in the real world, forensic 
evidence is increasingly accurate—a blanket ban on anonymity 
sacrifices traditionally held freedoms for perhaps unnecessarily 
heightened security concerns.97  Many criminals will likely not be 
deterred from using anonymity-protecting tools if we ban the tools, 
and many individuals will be swept into the ban who need the 
protection anonymity provides. 
II. SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court has not always been protective of 
anonymity, just as it has not always provided strong First 
Amendment protections.  But in a series of cases starting in the 
1960s, the Supreme Court recognized that anonymity is protected 
by the First Amendment.  However, Supreme Court doctrine 
leaves a number of important questions unanswered, with 
implications for both online real name policies and anti-mask laws. 
 
 94 Boudin, supra note 45, at 2155 (Authors that choose to remain anonymous often do 
so to avoid retaliation for speaking out about unpopular issues.). 
 95 Id. at 2166 (noting that the Court’s decision in Talley reasoned that ordinances were 
often overly broad, despite achieving the state’s interest). 
 96 Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 401–02. 
 97 Id. at 424 (discussing the scenarios in which users register for Internet services with 
credit cards). 
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A. Supreme Court Cases 
In 1928, the Supreme Court held that a Ku Klux Klan’s 
membership list was not protected from disclosure to the state.98  
The value of transparency to the state was worth more than the 
Klan’s interest in keeping membership lists private.  The Court 
reasoned that the state was entitled to be informed about 
associations within its territory.99 
However, in 1958 the Supreme Court distinguished the 1928 
case by referring to the violent historical nature of the Klan’s 
activities.100  The Court found in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson that Alabama failed to provide sufficient justification for 
revealing an NAACP membership list of “rank-and-file” 
members.101  The Court linked privacy with freedom of 
association, explaining that the “[i]nviolability of privacy in group 
association may in many circumstances be indispensable to 
preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group 
espouses dissident beliefs.”102  On many past occasions, revealing 
the identity of NAACP members had caused them to be subject to 
“manifestations of public hostility.”103  The state failed to 
demonstrate an interest “sufficient to justify the deterrent effect . . . 
[on] their constitutionally protected right of association.”104 
In 1960, the Supreme Court articulated a broader anonymous 
speech right, disaggregated from freedom of association, in Talley 
v. California.105  Talley challenged a Los Angeles ordinance that 
required persons distributing handbills to print their name and 
address on the cover of the handbill.106  California argued that the 
ordinance was intended to identify individuals responsible for 
fraud, false advertising, and libel.  However, the ordinance applied 
 
 98 People of New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 77 (1928). 
 99 Id. at 65. 
 100 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 465 (1958) (reasoning that the 
Klan in Zimmerman historically partook in “acts of unlawful intimidation and violence”). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 462. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 463. 
 105 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960). 
 106 Id. at 60. 
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to all handbills, not just fraudulent bills.107  The Court in Talley 
found the ordinance to be unconstitutional on its face.108 
Talley’s two-pronged support for anonymity is founded on an 
understanding of the First Amendment as protecting democratic 
self-governance.109  The Talley Court structured its argument 
around the example of anonymous political pamphleteering.110  
The Court reasoned that (1) banning anonymity interferes with a 
First Amendment freedom of distribution,111 and (2) laws that deter 
discussion by creating a fear of reprisal violate the First 
Amendment.112  The Talley understanding of the First 
Amendment’s protection of anonymity is founded on the example 
of anonymous individuals criticizing the more powerful 
government; those individuals distribute information, and are 
deterred by fears of reprisal.  Talley followed on NAACP by 
building on the connection between freedom of association and 
anonymity to find that laws that give rise to a fear of reprisal based 
on identification, either as part of a group or as an individual, 
should not be permitted. 
By contrast, the Court in the 1995 decision McIntyre v. Ohio 
departed in its reasoning from both Talley and NAACP.  The 
McIntyre Court based its protection for anonymous speech on a 
literary rather than political understanding of the First 
Amendment.113  The McIntyre Court conceived of anonymity as an 
editorial choice.114  Anonymity is a means of expressing oneself, 
and an author has the freedom to decide whether or not to disclose 
 
 107 Id. at 64. 
 108 Id. at 65. 
 109 See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2362–63 (2000) (explaining that the purpose of the 
First Amendment is to “preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas” and to function as 
the “guardian of our democracy,” which both are supported by the theory of self-
government). 
 110 See Talley, 362 U.S. at 537.  
 111 Lovell v. City of Griffin, Ga., 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938). 
 112 See Talley, 362 U.S. at 537, 538. 
 113 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (Stevens, J.) 
(holding that Ohio’s statutory prohibition against distribution of any anonymous 
campaign literature is a law “abridging the freedom of speech” within the meaning of the 
First Amendment). 
 114 Id. at 341, 372 
C02_KAMINSKI (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2013  2:41 PM 
2013] REAL MASKS AND REAL NAME POLICIES 835 
his or her true identity.115  An author may choose to be anonymous 
because of fear of retaliation, concern about social ostracism, or a 
desire to protect his or her privacy; the Court implied that the 
precise reason does not in fact matter.116  The Court found that “an 
author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions 
concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, 
is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First 
Amendment.”117 
In McIntyre, the Court had the option of addressing anonymity 
solely as an extension of political speech.  It did not.118  The Court 
found that requiring an author to identify herself “is a direct 
regulation of the content of speech.”119  The description of 
anonymity as an editorial choice allowed the Court to characterize 
a ban on anonymity as compelled speech.120  Requiring an author 
to disclose his or her name was compelled speech, which is 
unconstitutional absent a compelling state interest. 
Only at the end of the opinion did the Court in McIntyre return 
to the core of the Talley argument, that anonymity allows 
democratic participation by protecting the unpopular individual 
against the populace at large.121  “Anonymity is a shield from the 
tyranny of the majority.”122  And anonymity exemplifies the 
purpose of the First Amendment: “to protect unpopular individuals 
from retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—at the hand of 
an intolerant society.”123 
The Court suggested in McIntyre that a legitimate state interest 
could give rise to legitimate regulation of anonymity.124  For 
example, the state has an interest in preventing fraud and libel, so 
 
 115 Id. at 342. 
 116 Id. at 341–42. 
 117 Id. at 342.   
118   See Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 
OR. L. REV. 117, 128–31 (1996). 
 119 McIntyre, 513 U.S. at 345. 
 120 Id. at 349, 379. 
 121 See id. at 357. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id.  
 124 Id. at 353 (“[A] State’s enforcement interest might justify a more limited 
identification requirement.”). 
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anonymous speech might be less protected in those contexts.125  
But because Ohio also had a narrower prohibition on false 
statements made during political campaigns, the identity disclosure 
requirement in McIntyre was found overbroad.126  The Court 
explained that the state “cannot seek to punish fraud indirectly by 
indiscriminately outlawing a category of speech, based on its 
content, with no necessary relationship to the danger sought to be 
prevented.”127 
In 2002, the Supreme Court again addressed anonymous 
speech in Watchtower Bible v. Village of Stratton.128  The Village 
of Stratton required individuals engaging in door-to-door advocacy 
to first register with the mayor and receive a permit.129  Registrants 
were required to list their name and home address, and permits 
were routinely granted, though could be denied for incomplete 
information or for fraud.130  The Jehovah’s Witnesses brought the 
case without having applied for a permit, explaining that such an 
application would violate their First Amendment rights.131 
The Court in Watchtower Bible explicitly acknowledged 
McIntyre as having recognized “the right to distribute pamphlets 
anonymously.”132  The Court also referred to a broader category of 
protection: the “protection accorded to anonymous pamphleteering 
or discourse.”133  This protection is not absolute, “particularly 
when the solicitation of money is involved.”134  Thus, the Court 
must strike a balance between legitimate government interests and 
the effect of the regulations on First Amendment rights.135 
 
 125 See id. at 344, 349 (citing a California ordinance, which deals with false advertising, 
and an Ohio statute, which deals with false statements made in reference to political 
campaigns, as instances where state interest in preventing fraud and libel may override 
anonymous free speech). 
 126 See id. at 351. 
 127 Id. at 357. 
 128 See Watchtower Bible v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 153 (2002). 
 129 See id. at 154–55. 
 130 See id. at 155 n.4. 
 131 See id. at 157–58. 
 132 Id. at 159  
 133 Id. at 160. 
 134 Id. at 162. 
 135 Id. at 163. 
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The Court did not engage in lengthy analysis of why or how 
the First Amendment protects anonymity.  It instead used the fact 
that there are a “significant number of persons who support causes 
anonymously” in support of its finding that the ordinance was 
overly broad.136 
The Court found that the excessive breadth of the ordinance 
raised serious constitutional concerns, despite the legitimacy of the 
Village’s articulated interests.137  The Village argued that the 
ordinance served three interests: “the prevention of fraud, [the 
prevention of] crime, and the protection of privacy.”138  The Court 
recognized these as important interests.139  Later in the opinion, the 
Court recognized additional state interests in protecting the 
integrity of a ballot-initiative process, and preventing fraudulent 
commercial transactions.140  The Court held, however, that the 
Village failed to strike an appropriate balance between the amount 
of speech covered by the ordinance and the government interests it 
purported to serve, and that the ordinance was not adequately 
tailored to the Village’s stated interests.141  The Court stated that 
the overbreadth alone did not render the ordinance invalid, but the 
lack of tailoring in combination with the overbreadth did.142  It did 
not matter whether the anonymous speech itself was of high or low 
value, since the regulation was both overbroad and inadequately 
tailored to state interests.143 
The Court warned in Watchtower against using registration 
requirements as a work-around for speech regulations.144  If a 
particular kind of speech itself cannot be made a crime, then 
 
 136 Id. at 166. 
 137 See id. at 165–66. 
 138 Id. at 164–65. 
 139 Id. at 165. 
 140 See id. at 167. 
 141 See id. at 168. 
 142 See id. 
 143 In reviewing past cases, the Court observed that religious pamphleteering in 
particular has been recognized as high-value speech with a claim to freedom of speech 
and freedom of the press. See id. at 161.  The Court did not suggest, however, that lower 
value speech would not be protected; the high value of the speech was not the deciding 
factor—the overbreadth and lack of tailoring of the ordinance were the key features in the 
decision. Id. at 168. 
 144 See id. at 164. 
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governments may not work around that restriction by punishing 
speech solely because one has failed to register in advance of 
speaking.145  The Court found that the registration requirement 
imposes “an objective burden” on citizens, and bans “a significant 
amount spontaneous speech.”146  Quoting Thomas v. Collins, the 
Court noted that “[a]s a matter of principle a requirement of 
registration in order to make a public speech would seem generally 
incompatible with an exercise of the rights of free speech and free 
assembly.”147  The Court in Watchtower adds that it is 
“offensive . . . to the very notion of a free society—that in the 
context of everyday public discourse a citizen must first inform the 
government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain 
a permit to do so.”148  Registration of identity operates like a prior 
restraint, preventing speaking unless a license has been obtained or 
a tax paid.149 
The most interesting suggestion in Watchtower is the Court’s 
acknowledgment that anonymity may be contextual rather than 
absolute.  Even though the door-to-door petitioners would be 
revealing their faces to individuals, they still “maintain their 
anonymity” because their faces but not their identities are 
revealed.150  This conclusion treats anonymity as a communicative 
tool employed by speakers within the context of a relationship.  In 
the anti-mask context, this recognizes that anonymity is a selective 
disguise directed towards an audience, and does not require perfect 
obfuscation for First Amendment protection to be afforded.  
Similarly, the online context does not require perfect anonymity 
for First Amendment protection to be afforded to a speaker—it 
requires contextual anonymity.151 
 
 145 See id. 
 146 Id. at 167. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 165–66. 
 149 Id. at 167–68 (finding that “the regulation is analogous to the circulation licensing 
tax the Court invalidated in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)”). 
 150 Watchtower Bible v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 167 (2002) (“The fact that 
circulators revealed their physical identities did not foreclose our consideration of the 
circulators interest in maintaining their anonymity.”). 
151    See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 3 (2010) (describing privacy as 
“context-relative informational norms”). 
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The most recent Supreme Court case on anonymity is the 
Court’s 2010 decision in Doe v. Reed.152  Reed addresses the 
tension between disclosure and privacy in the context of electoral 
law.153  Washington State allows its voters to circulate and sign 
referendum petitions to challenge existing laws.154  Under state 
law, if the referendum petition achieved a critical mass of 
signatures, the referendum would be placed on the ballot, so the 
signature also functions as a vote.155  Washington State’s Public 
Records Act (PRA) made such referendum petitions publicly 
available.156  Doe sought an injunction against such disclosure, 
with respect to a petition against a state law extending benefits to 
same-sex couples.157 
The question before the Court was whether disclosure of 
referendum petitions in general—rather than this particular 
petition—violates the First Amendment, under a facial challenge to 
the Public Records Act.158  The Court concluded that disclosure of 
referendum petitions “does not as a general matter violate the First 
Amendment,” although disclosure of this particular petition might, 
in an as-applied challenge not yet brought before the Court.159 
The “electoral context” was central to the Court’s decision in 
Reed.160  Noting that states are allowed “significant flexibility in 
implementing their own voting systems,” and observing that the 
PRA is not a prohibition on speech but a disclosure requirement, 
the Court chose “exacting scrutiny” as the appropriate standard of 
review.161  Exacting scrutiny “requires a ‘substantial relation’ 
between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ 
governmental interest.”162  The Court found a substantial relation 
 
 152 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010). 
 153 Id. at 2824. 
 154 Id. at 2815. 
 155 See id. at 2817. 
 156 WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) (2008). 
 157 Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2813, 2816. 
 158 Id. at 2817. 
 159 Id. at 2822. 
 160 Id. at 2818. 
 161 Id.  
 162 Id. (quoting Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 
(2010)). 
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between a sufficiently important governmental interest—the 
“State’s interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral 
process”—and the disclosure requirement.163 
Thus in Reed, under a less protective standard of review 
imported from the electoral context, the Court recognized that state 
interests can trump the anonymity right.  In addition to or as 
subparts of the state’s interest in the integrity of the electoral 
process, the Court recognized the State’s “important interest” in 
preventing fraud, and promoting transparency and 
accountability.164  It refused to reach the State’s more generally 
asserted “informational interest.”165 
The Court explained that the plaintiffs could have prevailed 
under the First Amendment if they had shown “a reasonable 
probability that the compelled disclosure . . . will subject them to 
threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials 
or private parties.”166  The plaintiffs, however, failed to show 
specific harm caused by referendum petitions in general, which 
they would have to do in order to win a facial challenge.  Instead, 
they focused on harm related to the specific petition at issue.167  
Thus, the Court explained that while the plaintiffs had failed at the 
broad facial challenge, this did not foreclose the possibility of 
success in a narrower challenge.168 
The centrality of the election context in Reed cannot be 
overemphasized.  In the majority opinion, Justice Roberts 
distinguished between the majority’s application of exacting 
scrutiny and Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion by pointing out 
that Justice Thomas had chosen to employ strict scrutiny.169  The 
 
 163 Id. at 2819.  In greater detail, this interest was described as an interest in “preserving 
the integrity of the electoral process by combating fraud, detecting invalid signatures, and 
fostering government transparency and accountability.” Id. 
 164 Id.  
 165 Id.  
 166 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976)). 
 167 Id. at 2821. 
 168 Id.  
 169 Id. at 2820, n.2 (Roberts, C.J.) (stating that “Justice Thomas’s contrary assessment 
of the relationship between the disclosure of referendum petitions generally and the 
State’s interests in this case is based on his determination that strict scrutiny applies 
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lower standard of exacting scrutiny applies in the electoral context 
because of the required deference to states in implementing their 
voting systems, and the importance of disclosure specifically in 
this context.170 
One observation in Reed is of particular interest.  The majority 
found that signing a petition is fully protected speech, even though 
it is also a “legally operative legislative act.”171  This is relevant for 
online anonymity because online anonymity both serves as an 
“operative act” of concealing identity, and is at a very basic level 
speech.  There remains a question of whether an automatically-
generated “Anonymous” handle would be considered speech by 
the speaker.  Arguably, if the person at some point chose not to 
enter a handle, that would be equivalent to typing “Anonymous” as 
the handle, and therefore would be operative speech under Reed. 
Finally, the concurrences in Reed show some interesting 
turmoil around McIntyre.  Justice Scalia clearly still believes that 
McIntyre was wrongly decided,172 but acknowledges that the case 
recognized a “right to ‘speak’ anonymously.”173  Justice Stevens, 
with Justice Breyer, believes that McIntyre did not create a special 
separate right to speak anonymously—it dealt with a specific 
burden on the more general right to speak.174  This split will likely 
arise again in the next Supreme Court case on anonymity. 
Although it is not a case about anonymity per se, the recent 
Supreme Court case of U.S. v. Alvarez has significant implications 
for pseudonymous and anonymous speech.175  In Alvarez, the 
Court was asked to recognize false speech as an exception to the 
First Amendment.176  Alvarez had lied about having received a 
Medal of Honor; this lying was penalized under the Stolen Valor 
Act.177  The Court found that false speech is not one of the 
 
rather than the standard of review that we have concluded is appropriate”) (citation 
omitted). 
 170 See id. at 2818. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 2831 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 173 Id. at 2832 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 174 Id. at 2831 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 175 See 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
 176 Id. at 2539–40. 
 177 Id. at 2539 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 704(b) and (c) (2006)). 
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recognized historical exceptions to the First Amendment, and 
therefore lying is protected by the First Amendment.178  Specific 
sub-types of false speech, such as fraud and defamation, are 
exceptions to the First Amendment because they create a “legally 
cognizable harm.”179  False statements to courts or Government 
officials, or impersonating an officer, are exceptions to the First 
Amendment because they concern the “integrity of Government 
processes.”180 
If Alvarez had been decided differently, and held that false 
speech is an exception to the First Amendment, then anonymity 
and especially pseudonymity might be regulable as false 
statements about one’s identity.  This would have placed Alvarez 
in direct conflict with McIntyre.  Instead, Alvarez indicates that the 
current Court is extremely speech-protective, and disinclined to 
create new exceptions to the First Amendment.181  Writing under a 
pseudonym will presumably be protected under Alvarez, because 
lying about one’s identity should be no less protected than any 
other kind of lie, barring an exceptional state interest. 
Thus the question that remains is not whether anonymity is 
protected, but how much protection it receives, and how to handle 
anonymity that also serves a noncommunicative function.  If 
anonymity is used to defame somebody, or is part of speech that is 
“integral to criminal conduct,” or is used to propagate obscenity, it 
will presumably at some point lose First Amendment protection.182  
Then there remains a question—debated in the Stevens and Scalia 
concurrences in Reed—of whether there is a right to anonymous 
speech, or protection for anonymity as a corollary of the right to 
speak more generally.183  McIntyre suggests that all anonymity-
through-speaking is an editorial choice and thus protected as 
speech, but Talley suggests that anonymity is based on freedom of 
distribution, and freedom of association. 
 
 178 Id.  
 179 See id.  
 180 Id. at 2546. 
 181 See id. at 2545–46. 
 182 See id. at 2539 (listing categories of unprotected speech). 
 183 See id. at 2831 n.4 (describing both Justices’ interpretations). 
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B. Open Questions 
Commentators appear to agree that First Amendment 
protection for anonymity is not absolute.184  From this point, 
however, scholars vary significantly both in how strong they 
understand First Amendment protection for anonymity to be, and 
which Supreme Court cases they identify as the foundation of 
anonymity analysis.  The points of consensus and differentiation 
center on the following discussions: (1) whether the First 
Amendment protects only core political speech; (2) whether broad 
disclosure requirements are constitutional; (3) what kinds of 
compelling state interests might overcome First Amendment 
protection; (4) whether election law cases are exceptions to or 
illustrative of the balancing rule; and (5) how much of a showing 
of retaliation, if any, is necessary to establish the First Amendment 
right.  Finally, there is an open question about untraceability: has 
the Court ever considered the harm to law enforcement that arises 
from complete untraceability? 
The majority of commentators focus their analysis on Talley, 
McIntyre, and Watchtower Bible as the sources of a First 
Amendment anonymity right.  The primary question appears to be 
how broadly the right to anonymous speech extends from political 
speech to other kinds of speech.185  Anonymous political speech is 
clearly protected.  Are other kinds of anonymous speech equally 
deserving of First Amendment protection? 
This focus on the speech’s value might stem from an 
agreement among commentators that the anonymity right is not 
 
 184 See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, The Privacy Privilege: Law Enforcement, Technology, 
and the Constitution, 7 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2002) (“The First Amendment protects 
the privacy of certain acts.”) (emphasis added); Ekstrand, supra note 37, at 407 (“The 
protections for anonymous speech are not absolute.”); Choi, supra note 5, at 520 
(“[A]dvocates consistently refer to anonymity as a fundamental human right, regardless 
of how limited or uncertain it may be.”); Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1537–38 
(“[T]he First Amendment, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, confers 
upon authors a right to speak anonymously or pseudonymously . . . . But this right to 
speak anonymously is not absolute.”). 
 185 See, e.g., Ekstrand, supra note 37, at 413 (“While many commentators agreed that 
the kind of anonymous political speech published by Mrs. McIntyre deserved the highest 
level of First Amendment protection, they expressed concern about whether McIntyre 
protected other kinds of speech and under what circumstances it should.”). 
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absolute.186  They thus perceive a need for a balancing test between 
the value of the anonymous speech and state interests.  The 
balancing test view of protection for anonymity weighs the quality 
of the speech being protected against the nature of the state interest 
being propagated.  The first point of division between 
commentators is whether the speech must be “core” First 
Amendment speech to be protected.187  This leaves open the 
question of whether nonpolitical anonymous speech is protected by 
the First Amendment. 
The other half of the balancing equation concerns what 
constitutes a sufficiently compelling state interest.  Again, several 
commentators point to the regulation of fraud, false advertising, 
and libel as sufficient state interests for the regulation of 
anonymous speech, if a statute is adequately tailored to those 
interests.188  Analogously, associational privacy could be overcome 
by the state interest in forbidding discrimination in places of public 
accommodation.189  Earlier cases on anonymity leave open the 
possibility that obscenity, commercial solicitation, and the 
advocacy of unlawful conduct might be exceptions as well.190 
The state interest alone is not enough, however; others point 
out that the regulation must be narrowly tailored to it.191  Thus 
commentators disagree over whether a compelling state interest 
might allow regulation of all anonymous speech, in the form of 
imposing real-name policies, or whether real-name policies are not 
viable because they will never be narrowly tailored. 
 
 186 See, e.g., Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities, supra note 1, at ¶ 58 
(“Nevertheless, the right to privacy in one’s political associations and beliefs can be 
overcome by a compelling state interest.”). 
 187 Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 427 (“Doctrinal discussions of 
permissible restrictions on the freedom of speech commonly divide the discussion into 
‘political’ and ‘non-political’ speech, and the sketch which follows adopts this 
convention.”); Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1541 (“Laws requiring disclosure in the 
context of political speech, on the other hand, should be (if anything) even more difficult 
to justify; in the context of commercial speech, however, the assumption of a rational, 
critical audience may give way to more paternalistic assumptions and thus make it 
relatively easy for the state to compel disclosure.”). 
 188 See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960). 
 189 See Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 429. 
 190 See Choi, supra note 5, at 537.  
 191 See, e.g., Ekstrand, supra note 37, at 411. 
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The biggest challenge pro-anonymity commentators appear to 
face in anonymity case law is the body of election law cases.192  
Some distinguish these cases as specific to the electoral context, 
arguing that there is a long American tradition of anonymous 
speech, but an equally compelling tradition of transparency in 
political proceedings.193  I agree that the election law cases are 
distinguishable. 
This brings us to a final question regarding existing case law: 
whether an anonymous speaker must make a showing of retaliation 
in order to prevail, or if a court may conclude without evidence 
that a chilling effect may occur.  This is actually a broader question 
about First Amendment chilling effects doctrine, which, while 
often cited, is woefully underexplored.194  Froomkin, for example, 
recognizes that when dissidents demonstrate a credible fear of 
retaliation for what they say, they are usually protected.195  In 
NAACP, the Court pointed out that the NAACP made a strong 
concrete showing that its members would experience retaliation.  
In Doe v. Reed, the Court explained that the facial challenge failed 
because the Does had failed to make a showing of retaliation for all 
disclosures.  In both Talley and McIntyre, however, the Court did 
not appear to ask for a showing of retaliation. 
As for untraceability, the Supreme Court has never engaged in 
discussion of how traceable and untraceable anonymity differ.  The 
state arguably has a stronger interest in preventing untraceable 
anonymity, because completely untraceable anonymity precludes 
law enforcement.196  There are two possible explanations for the 
Court’s failure to consider the spectrum of traceability.  First, there 
may have been no difference between traceable and untraceable 
anonymity in the days before good forensics; all anonymity might 
have been functionally untraceable, or too costly to trace absent a 
 
 192 See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 586 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. John Doe No. 1 
v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (holding that, in general, the disclosure of referendum 
petitions does not violate First Amendment speech protection). 
 193 Boudin, supra note 45, at 2164. 
 194 Lidsky, Silencing John Doe, supra note 36, at 888 n.169. 
 195 Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 429 (noting that the Supreme Court 
tends to be “highly solicitous of the need of dissidents and others to speak anonymously 
when they have a credible fear of retaliation for what they say”). 
 196 See Choi, supra note 5, at 526–28. 
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witness.  Conversely, the Court may never have had to consider 
truly untraceable anonymity because each of its subjects—Talley 
and McIntyre—had in fact been traced.  First Amendment 
anonymity served in those cases to provide a curtain of additional 
obscurity, not to prevent law enforcement from finding identity if 
necessary through other means.197 
However, the Court in Watchtower specifically addressed a 
blanket ban against untraceable (or less traceable) anonymity.198  
The Village required canvassers to register with the government 
prior to engaging in door-to-door advocacy, and to provide a list of 
which homes would be visited.199  Presumably, if anything 
occurred during canvassing, the government could easily trace the 
perpetrator through the list of names and locations.  The Court did 
not state that this type of registration requirement is always 
unconstitutional, but required legitimate state interests and 
tailoring to those interests before such a registration requirement 
could be constitutional.200  General registration burdens an 
enormous amount of speech, untailored to a state interest, and all 
spontaneous speech would be presumptively illegal.201 
III. ANTI-MASK LAWS AND CASES 
In light of the open questions left by Supreme Court doctrine 
on anonymity, anti-mask laws and case law illuminate a great deal 
about the scope of legal protection for anonymity.  The cases show 
both how courts treat anonymity in the real world, and how courts 
might treat blanket real-name policies online. 
Anti-mask case law displays courts struggling with 
fundamental questions about anonymity, including the question of 
when anonymity implicates First Amendment rights.  Some courts 
treat mask-enabled anonymity as conduct rather than speech; some 
look to the content of the masks to determine if the mask-wearing 
 
 197 Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CAL. 
L. REV. 1 (2013). 
 198 See Watchtower Bible v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002). 
 199 Id. at 155.  
 200 See id. at 168. 
 201 Id. at 167. 
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is expressive; others observe that anonymity is inherently entwined 
with expression and freedom of association.  Courts, like Doe 
scholars, also differ as to their underlying intuitions about 
anonymity’s nature.  Some courts assume that anonymity is 
inherently threatening; others assume that it is fundamentally 
important to a free society. 
This section additionally observes that there is a circuit split 
developing in anti-mask case law.  Previous scholars have 
characterized this split as evidence of legal realism at work—“the 
KKK loses, but Iranian students win.”202  The situation is both 
more nuanced and more interesting. 
This Part opens with an overview of the different kinds of anti-
mask statutes.  Some statues are broader than others, and thus more 
strongly implicate freedom of expression.  It then turns to the case 
law in an effort to distinguish between those cases that uphold anti-
mask statutes and those that find them problematic.  Courts vary in 
their treatment of the nexus between anonymity and expression, 
their treatment of mask-wearing as symbolic speech, and their 
intuitions about anonymity itself.   
As a consequence of these variations, different courts have 
imposed different burdens on defendants and on the state.  In some 
cases, courts require defendants to show evidence of past 
retaliation in order to find a nexus between anonymity and 
expression; in others, they do not.  In some cases, courts require 
the state to show evidence of a link between anonymity and the 
state interest in preventing crime; in others, they do not.  A 
common holding, even among a number of the cases upholding 
anti-mask statutes, is that anti-mask statutes as written are often 
too broad.  This has significant implications for proposed online 
real-name policies. 
 
 202 See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, The 
Clipperchip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 822 n.478 (1995) (addressing 
the “mixed reception” of strict liability antimask statutes very briefly) [hereinafter 
Froomkin, The Clipperchip]. 
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A. Anti-Mask Statutes 
Many states have passed anti-mask statutes, but states vary 
widely in what behavior they criminalize.  Other scholars have 
noted some of the variations, but none appear to have outlined the 
complete spectrum.203  This article finds that anti-mask statutes are 
more varied than previous scholarship suggests. 
State anti-mask laws arose primarily in response to the actions 
of the Ku Klux Klan.204  A number of anti-mask laws were 
therefore enacted in the early 1950s.205  However, an early 1845 
New York anti-mask law arose out of demonstrations and riots by 
anti-rent protestors disguised as Indians.206 
Many states criminalize all mask-wearing in public.207  This 
type of statute is typically subject to a list of exceptions for 
customary uses of masks, such as mask-wearing on Halloween or 
en route to masquerades.  Within this category of statute, states 
differ as to which exceptions are permitted.  But this type of statute 
functionally creates a strict liability crime: if you wear a mask in 
public, you violate the statute. 
Several states, by contrast, penalize mask-wearing when the 
wearer’s intent is to conceal identity.208  Rather than creating a 
strict liability crime, this requires an additional showing of intent 
 
 203 See Wayne R. Allen, Klan, Cloth and Constitution: Anti-Mask Laws and the First 
Amendment, 25 GA. L. REV. 819, 821 (1991) (describing two types of statutes: a general 
anti-mask statute, and a statute that criminalizes mask-wearing with the intent to deprive 
somebody of their civil rights); Stephen J. Simoni, Note, Who Goes There?—Proposing a 
Model Anti-Mask Act, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 241, 242 (1992) (describing two types of 
statutes: a general statute, and a statute that criminalizes wearing a mask with the intent to 
commit a crime); Evan Darwin Winet, Face-Veil Bans and Anti-Mask Laws: State 
Interests and the Right to Cover the Face, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 217, 231–
33 (2012) (employing the same two classifications as Simoni). 
 204 Allen, supra note 203, at 827. 
 205 See Jeanine Bell, Policing Hatred: Police Bias Units and the Construction of Hate 
Crime, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 421, 430–31 (1997); see, e.g., REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:313 
(West 1986); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1301 (1981). 
 206 See People v. Aboaf, 187 Misc. 2d 173, 183, 721 N.Y.S.2d 725, 733 (Crim. Ct. 
2001) (discussing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(4) (LexisNexis 2012)). 
 207 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.735 (West 1987) (banning public mask-wearing 
except if “incidental to amusement or entertainment”). 
 208 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 185 (LexisNexis 2012) (criminalizing wearing a mask 
in public places with the intent to conceal identity). 
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by the state.  Functionally, however, it can allow for the arrest of 
anybody wearing a mask, and the showing of intent might not be 
particularly difficult given that most masks obscure identity. 
A third category of statutes bolsters the intent requirement, 
criminalizing wearing a mask for the purpose of depriving another 
person of civil rights.  The federal anti-mask law exemplifies this 
type of statute; the federal law allowed for federal prosecution of 
the KKK when they attempted to interfere with individuals’ right 
to vote.209 
Connecticut has created a fourth type of statute, which 
penalizes wearing a mask with the intent to subject somebody to 
rights deprivation while in fact violating a separate provision on 
rights deprivation.210  This hybrid statute requires both intent 
(wearing the mask with the intent to perform rights deprivation) 
and action (actually depriving somebody of their rights).211 
The fifth type of anti-mask statute requires more than intent to 
conceal one’s identity, and arguably more than intent to violate 
somebody’s rights, but less than action; it criminalizes wearing a 
mask for the purpose of committing a crime.212  This changes the 
crime from being wearing a mask, per se, to using a mask with the 
intent that it serve as a criminal tool.213 
The sixth type of statute criminalizes wearing a mask during 
the actual commission of a crime.214  This varies from the fifth 
type of statute.  The fifth type would allow arrest of a mask-wearer 
before a crime, but requires a showing of intent to commit a crime.  
The sixth requires the actual commission of a crime, but not 
necessarily the intent to use the mask as a tool.215 
 
 209 See United States v. Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 250 F. Supp. 330, 349 
(D.C. La. 1965) (holding that “the Civil Rights Act of 1957 applies to . . . interfering with 
the right to register as well as interfering with the right to vote”). 
 210 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-37(a) (2011) (criminalizing the deprivation of a person’s 
civil rights by a person is wearing a hood, mask, or other device designed to conceal their 
identity). 
 211 Id. 
 212 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:313 (1986) (criminalizing mask-wearing with 
the intent to conceal identity).  
 213 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-2(c)(4) (2012). 
 214 Id. 
 215 Compare id., with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:313 (West 1986). 
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The variation in anti-mask statutes suggests that legislatures, 
like courts, struggle with determining when anonymity is 
functional and when it is expressive.  Some statutes assume that all 
mask-wearing is fundamentally functional in nature.  All mask-
wearing can thus be banned, unless the wearer adds some 
additional expressive element, such as religious significance.   
On the other end of the spectrum, however, some states 
criminalize mask-wearing only when the mask has been used in the 
commission of a crime, suggesting that anonymity is understood to 
have social value, until it becomes clearly functionally harmful.  
When used in the commission of a crime, anonymity becomes 
primarily functional in nature, and the statute interest in preventing 
harm overrides any expressive interest in the mask. 
Between these two poles, some states ban mask-wearing only 
when the wearer intends for the mask to serve an identity-
concealing function, or to aid in the commission of another 
offense.  The civil rights-related anti-mask laws fall into this 
middle category.  The mask need not actually be used as a criminal 
tool, but the burden of showing intent rests with the state, not the 
wearer. 
B. Anti-Mask Case Law 
Most of the anti-mask statutes challenged in court have been 
the first type of statute, which establishes general liability for 
mask-wearing in public, subject to a list of exceptions.216  This 
indicates that where masking is clearly done in service of a 
nefarious purpose, petitioners deem it unlikely that a court will 
strike down the statute.  A number of courts have found general 
anti-mask statutes unconstitutionally overbroad, recognizing that 
they cover an impermissible amount of expressive conduct.  
However, a number of courts have also upheld the constitutionality 
of general anti-mask laws. 
The split appears to have arisen for the most part around the 
question of when anonymity is conduct and when it is expressive.  
Strangely, however, a few courts have found that anonymity is 
expressive but still upheld the statutes.  These courts conclude that 
 
 216 See Simoni, supra note 203, at 243–44. 
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anonymity is a particularly bad kind of expression that states can 
permissibly ban because it is frightening.  After the Supreme 
Court’s holding on true threats in Virginia v. Black, this line of 
reasoning should no longer be considered good law.217 
For our purposes, it is helpful to read these cases with an eye 
towards what assumptions the court makes about the default nature 
of anonymity.  Is it conduct?  Does it have a nexus with 
expression, and if it does, what is the burden of proof as to that 
nexus?  If anonymity is expression, is it protected expression, or a 
threat in and of itself?  Courts have split widely on their answers to 
these questions. 
Where courts have struck down or limited anti-mask laws, it 
has been for a number of reasons.  Some find the laws overbroad, 
and some find the laws too vague.  Some find that masks are 
symbolic speech, and the statute fails the O’Brien test.  Some have 
found that anonymity is conduct, but implicates freedom of speech 
and association under NAACP and Talley.  One recent case treated 
anonymity as a First Amendment right in itself, under McIntyre.218  
These cases show that despite a recent Second Circuit decision 
upholding New York’s anti-mask law, there is a history of 
jurisprudence recognizing a link between anonymity and free 
expression in the context of anti-mask laws.  Courts that have 
upheld anti-mask statutes find that the statutes primarily regulate 
conduct and not speech; that mask-wearing is not symbolic speech; 
or, similarly, that there has been an insufficient showing of a nexus 
between mask-wearing and freedom of association. 
1. The Earliest Cases 
The earliest anti-mask cases came down long before the 
Supreme Court began considering a First Amendment right to 
anonymity in the 1960s.  The earliest cases primarily concerned 
the scope of anti-mask statutes, and what the statutes meant when 
they criminalized individuals for being “masked” or “in disguise.”  
 
 217 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362 (2003) (finding that a statute banning cross 
burning with intent to intimidate violates the First Amendment). 
 218 Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d 835, 844 (N.D. 
Ind. 1999). 
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These cases understandably did not address the First Amendment, 
but they are nonetheless helpful for understanding the purpose and 
scope of anti-mask laws.  Early cases limit the scope of anti-mask 
laws, refusing to apply the laws to partial or unintentional 
disguises.  This shows that even early courts recognized the need 
for limits on anti-mask laws.  These cases also show that anti-
masks laws are, in the eye of courts, proxies for regulation of 
anonymity rather than a bans on expressive disguise. 
In the 1871 case Dale v. Gunter, the Supreme Court of 
Alabama rejected charges filed against a person concealed in 
bushes.  The man was charged with being a “person in 
disguise.”219  The court explained that being in the bushes was a 
position, while being in disguise entailed wearing a dress or mask 
“intended to conceal the person who wears it.”220  What is 
interesting about this interpretation is that it reads in an element of 
intent: the wearer must intend to be concealed.221  Later courts and 
other statutes do not always require intent to conceal.222 
Several early challenges to anti-mask laws contended that the 
laws were void for vagueness because they did not adequately 
define the term “mask” or “disguised.”  These cases address 
whether being “disguised” covers partial disguises such as 
makeup, or covers only complete anonymity.  In Anderson v. 
Texas, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas found that the term 
“mask” was not too vague.  However, the portion of the statute 
criminalizing disguising oneself in a manner as to “render [the 
offender’s] identification impossible, or more difficult” to identify 
was too indefinitely framed.223  Two subsequent Texas cases 
similarly upheld the term “mask” against a void-for-vagueness 
challenge.224  A 1969 Texas case, Garcia v. Texas, clarified that 
the anti-mask law applied only to disguises that made it impossible 
 
 219 Dale v. Gunter, 46 Ala. 118, *9 (Sup. Ct. Ala. 1871). 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
 222 See infra Part III.A.3. 
 223 21 S.W.2d 499, 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 1929). 
 224 Dellinger v. State, 28 S.W.2d 537, 539 (Tex. Crim. App. 1930); see also Caldwell v. 
State, 75 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 1934). 
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to identify the defendant.225  Thus courts have equated masking 
oneself with fully obscuring one’s identity, or making oneself 
anonymous.  These cases show that courts understood anti-mask 
statutes to be prohibitions on anonymity, not prohibitions on 
dressing up. 
Even in these early cases, it is apparent that courts were aware 
that anti-mask laws could be too broad.  A 1912 New York court 
reversed a conviction where a defendant was arrested in front of a 
theater wearing makeup and women’s clothes and charged with 
vagrancy for being “in disguise.”226  The court explained that “if 
this conviction of this young man be allowed to stand, there is no 
reason why the disguised circus ‘barker,’ the midway ‘ballyhoo,’ 
or even the masquerader at the ball could not be convicted of 
vagrancy under this statute, each for having indulged in his own 
particular antics; and such a conviction, although perhaps it might 
be deemed righteous by many, would be going far beyond 
anything conceived by the Legislature.”227 
Although the O’Brien standard for symbolic speech had not yet 
been established, this court appears to recognize the value in 
expressive conduct.  An anti-mask statute applied too broadly 
would implicate a variety of expressive conduct that occurs in 
everyday social life.  Interestingly, this case does not restrict the 
scope of the statute to a ban on anonymity; it recognizes that some 
forms of anonymity, such as that enjoyed by masqueraders at the 
ball, can be expressive, and thus would not appropriately be 
covered by the anti-mask statute. 
It is thus clear that early courts, even before the Supreme Court 
connected anonymity to the First Amendment, perceived a line 
between regulable and unregulable behavior affected by anti-mask 
laws.228 
 
 225 443 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). 
 226 People v. Luechini, 136 N.Y.S. 319, 320–21 (1912). 
 227 Id.  
 228 See id. 
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2. Cases Finding Anti-Mask Laws Unconstitutional 
A number of courts have subsequently found anti-mask laws 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.  Courts that find anti-
mask statutes unconstitutional have done so for a variety of 
reasons.  Several cases focus on the nexus between anonymity and 
freedom of expression and association.  Several courts instead find 
that the state has failed to show a significant state interest in 
regulating anonymity, by failing to produce evidence of the 
connection between anonymity and other criminal conduct.  One 
court found that the anti-mask statute targeted speech, not conduct, 
and thus should be subject to strict scrutiny, which it failed. 
Two courts in 1978 found anti-mask laws to be 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.229  Both cases 
addressed masked protests by groups mobilizing against the Shah 
of Iran.230  Both described anonymity not as a First Amendment 
right in itself, but as essential to the exercise of First Amendment 
rights under NAACP v. Alabama.231  The earlier case hinged on the 
direct chilling effect on speech and the use of masks as symbolic 
speech, while the latter case instead addressed the statute’s 
overbreadth and vagueness.232 
In Aryan v. Mackey, students claimed that a university 
regulation that prevented them from protesting the Shah of Iran 
while masked violated the First Amendment.233  The university had 
granted a demonstration permit, but barred the students from 
wearing masks while demonstrating.234 
The students in Aryan made two First Amendment claims.235  
The first was what the court called a “non-communicative claim” 
about the function of anonymity: without the masks, the students 
 
 229 Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 94 (N.D. Tex.1978); Ghafari v. Mun. Ct. for the 
S.F. Jud. Dist. of S.F., 87 Cal. App. 3d 255, 259 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). 
 230 Aryan, 462 F. Supp. at 91; Ghafari, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 258–59. 
 231 Aryan, 462 F. Supp. at 92; Ghafari, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 261. 
 232 Compare Aryan, 462 F. Supp. at 92 (finding an anti-mask statute unconstitutional 
because it interfered with an individual’s ability to exercise their First Amendment 
rights), with Ghafari, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 265 (finding an anti-mask statute 
unconstitutional because it is “overbroad and vague”). 
 233 Aryan, 462 F. Supp. at 91. 
 234 Id.  
 235 Id.  
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claimed they feared reprisal and would be afraid to demonstrate.236  
The second claim was that the masks themselves had “become 
symbols of protests against the Shah’s regime.”237 
The court recognized that the First Amendment “does not grant 
the right to anonymity.”238  However, the court added, citing Talley 
and NAACP, that “First Amendment questions arise . . . when there 
is such a nexus between anonymity and speech that a bar on the 
first is tantamount to a prohibition on the second.”239 
The court did not require the students to prove that they would 
in fact be persecuted.  Instead, the court reasoned that it was 
apparent under the circumstances that identifiable students would 
withdraw from protected activity out of fear of consequences if 
they were not afforded anonymity.240  The court therefore found 
that mask-wearing “is so closely connected to the speech that a 
loss of the activity results in a loss of the expression itself.”241  The 
University failed to show that the regulation would further its 
interest in preventing violence on campus, so the court found that 
the regulation failed. 
Concerning the second claim—that the masks were symbolic 
speech—the Aryan court stated without examination that the masks 
“have become a symbol of opposition to a regime which is of such 
a character that its detractors believe they must disguise their 
identity to protect themselves.”242  Then, as with the first claim, the 
court pointed out that the University had failed to supply a single 
concrete fact regarding the causal connection between the 
regulation of masks and the prevention of potential violence. 
Thus the Aryan court found that mask-wearing both had a 
significant nexus with free expression as conduct, and was 
symbolic speech.  Because the state failed to show a concrete state 
interest by linking mask-wearing to violence through evidence, the 
regulation was found to be unconstitutional. 
 
 236 Id. at 90. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. at 92. 
 239 Id.  
 240 Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)). 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id.  
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A second 1978 case also granted First Amendment protection 
to mask-wearing, finding that the anti-mask statute at issue was 
overbroad.243  In Ghafari v. Municipal Court for San Francisco 
Judicial District of San Francisco, which came down a few 
months after Aryan in December 1978, the California Court of 
Appeal considered the constitutionality of the California anti-mask 
statute.244  Iranian nationals had been arrested for picketing with 
leaflets placed between their glasses and faces.245  The California 
statute is a general anti-mask statute prohibiting partially or 
completely concealing one’s face with intent to conceal identity, 
with a list of exceptions.246  It was originally enacted in 1923.247 
The appellants contended that the anti-mask statute was 
facially overbroad.248  They claimed that the statute prohibited 
anonymity where freedom of speech, peaceful assembly, and free 
association might be involved.  This ban was not required by a 
compelling state interest, nor implemented in the least restrictive 
manner. 
Like the court in Aryan, the court in Ghafari did not require the 
appellants to show that identification would result in reprisals.249  
Instead, the court recognized that appellants had alleged fear of 
retaliatory measures and that they would not have participated in 
the demonstrations if they had not been able to protect their 
anonymity.250  The court found this allegation adequate, and 
 
 243 See Ghafari v. Mun. Ct. for S.F. Jud. Dist. of S.F., 87 Cal. App. 3d 255, 265 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1978) (holding a California anti-mask statute unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment). 
 244 Id. at 258. 
 245 Id. at 258–59. 
 246 Id. at 259–60. 
 247 Id. at 260. 
 248 Id. 
 249 See generally id. (The Court in Ghafari struck down the state’s anti-mask statute as 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.  In doing so, the Court did not require appellants 
to provide evidence that they had a fear of reprisals when choosing to engage in 
anonymous protesting.); see also Aryan v. Mackey, 463 F. Supp. 90, 92 (N.D. Tex. 1978) 
(where, instead of requiring petitioners to provide evidence of reprisals, the Court simply 
accepted the general rule reached in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958), 
that to compel disclosure of one’s identity may dissuade persons from exercising their 
freedom of speech for fear of reprisals). 
 250 Ghafari, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 259. 
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recognized the potential for a chilling effect if masking were not 
allowed.  This chilling effect stemmed from the appellants’ 
perception, not from concrete proof of past or future reprisals in 
Iran. 
Like the court in Aryan, the court in Ghafari recognized that 
even though the appellants did not assert an absolute right to 
anonymity, “anonymity is essential to the exercise of constitutional 
rights,” citing NAACP.251  The court found the anti-mask statute to 
be overbroad, because it inhibited the exercise of free speech and 
exposed speakers to retaliation.252 
In part, the court came to this finding because of the existence 
of a similar but narrower California law, which criminalized the 
wearing a mask for the purpose of concealment or evading 
discovery.253  The narrower provision served a legitimate law 
enforcement function.254  The court explained that “the wearing of 
a mask per se does not affect adversely any legitimate state 
interest,” so banning the wearing of a mask with no criminal 
purpose served no legitimate law enforcement function and was 
constitutionally overbroad.255  The Ghafari court also found that 
the amusement and entertainment exceptions in the statute were 
inherently vague, and violated the equal protection clause because 
they favored amusement and entertainment over other protected 
First Amendment expression.256  The court did not even reach the 
question of whether the masks were symbolic speech.257 
The Ghafari court thus focused on overbreadth and the nexus 
between anonymity and free expression.  It did not find it 
necessary to determine whether masks were symbolic speech.  
Anonymity itself could receive protection without embodying 
additional expressive value through symbolism. 
 
 251 Id. at 260 (citing NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462); see also Aryan, 463 F. Supp. at 92 
(explaining that while the First Amendment does not grant a right to anonymity, 
constitutional questions nevertheless arise where there is a nexus between anonymity and 
speech).  
 252 Ghafari, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 259, 262. 
 253 Id. at 261–62. 
 254 Id. at 262. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. at 265–66. 
 257 Id. at 266 n.5. 
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A 1981 case similarly found the Florida anti-mask statute to be 
overbroad, but not under the First Amendment.258  The Supreme 
Court of Florida in Robinson v. State found that the Florida anti-
mask statute deprived the appellant of due process because it was 
overbroad.259  The Florida statute, which addressed all masks, with 
exceptions, was found to be “susceptible of application to entirely 
innocent activities . . . so as to create prohibitions that completely 
lack any rational basis.”260  The court did not reach the First 
Amendment arguments. 
Two cases in the 1990s found anti-mask statutes 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.  These cases focused 
on mask-wearing as symbolic speech, rather than the nexus 
between anonymity and free expression. 
In 1990, a district court found a Tennessee city ordinance 
banning masks to be unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment.261  The City of Pulaski had passed an ordinance 
banning masks in parades after the Ku Klux Klan initially 
requested to parade downtown on Martin Luther King, Jr. Day.262  
The district court found the ordinance unconstitutional.  First, the 
court found that the ordinance allowed too much latitude to 
officials for denial of permits.263  Second, it found that particularly 
in “the context of parades and demonstrations, certain masks and 
disguises may constitute strong symbolic political expression that 
is afforded protection by the First Amendment.”264  The ordinance 
was thus constitutionally overbroad, because it could be used to 
stifle symbolic expression.265  The court cited a Seventh Circuit 
case in which the wearing of military uniforms in a parade had 
been similarly found to be clear symbolic expression.266 
 
 258 Robinson v. State, 393 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. 1981). 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. at 1077. 
 261 Ku Klux Klan v. MLK Worshippers, 735 F. Supp. 745, 751 (D.C. Tenn. 1990). 
 262 Id. at 747. 
 263 Id. at 749. 
 264 Id. at 751 (citations omitted). 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. (citing Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1200 (7th Cir. 1978)). 
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In 1997, another court found mask-wearing to be symbolic 
speech and thus protected by the First Amendment.267  A man wore 
a ninja mask to a local government meeting in protest of the 
Commission’s attempt to ban public participation in the meetings.  
The mayor told him to take the mask off.  Everybody knew the 
man’s identity, and nobody appeared to be afraid of him.  The 
court found that the mask-wearing was symbolic speech, because 
even though the man had not conveyed a very specific message, 
the Supreme Court has never required symbolic speech to be very 
particularized.  The court also found that the government interest 
was not strong: the trial court, supported by the record, found that 
the mask-wearing was not disruptive of the meeting and did not 
inspire fear.  Because the city failed to establish a content-neutral 
basis that served a substantial government interest for regulating 
expressive conduct, exacting scrutiny was required and the 
prohibition of the ninja mask was unconstitutional. 
Perhaps the strongest First Amendment protection for mask-
wearing is found in American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City 
of Goshen.268  Rather than asking whether mask-wearing is 
symbolic speech, or examining a nexus between anonymity and 
free expression, the court in Goshen recognized a freestanding 
right to anonymity established in McIntyre.  That right was 
violated by a city’s anti-mask ordinance. 
The district court in Goshen addressed a city ordinance 
prohibiting the wearing of a mask in a public place for the purpose 
of disguising one’s identity.269  While recognizing that the KKK’s 
white hood and mask carry special significance during religious 
ceremonies and that the mask is “an essential part of their uniform 
and organizational identity,” the court did not base its finding on 
symbolic speech.270  Rather, the court held that the ordinance “by 
prohibiting the wearing of masks for the purpose of concealing 
 
 267 Dayton v. Esrati, 707 N.E.2d 1140, 1144–47 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). 
 268 Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Ind. 
1999). 
 269 See id. at 836. 
 270 See id. at 837, 844. 
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identity in public, burdens the free speech and association 
rights.”271 
The record before the court in Goshen showed “harassment, 
threats of violence, job firings, and other retaliation” for 
membership in the AKKKK.272  The city had also conceded that at 
least some AKKKK members wore masks to conceal identity and 
retain anonymity.273  Thus, the court found that under NAACP, 
Buckley v. Valeo, Talley, and McIntyre, there could be no doubt 
that the anti-mask statute would, as in Talley “tend to restrict 
freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of 
expression.”274 
The Goshen court showed the obvious influence of McIntyre in 
deciding that the anti-mask ordinance governed speech, not 
conduct.275  The court made it clear that the anti-mask ordinance 
was “not content neutral,” because prohibiting anonymity “is a 
direct regulation of the content of speech or expression.”276 
Applying the “exacting scrutiny” used by the Supreme Court in 
McIntyre, the court found that the city’s ordinance was not 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.277  As in 
Aryan, the court in Goshen found that the government’s record did 
not support a connection between the ordinance and the asserted 
interest of preventing violence and apprehending criminals.278 
One year after Goshen, another district court considered a 
city’s anti-mask ordinance and found it unconstitutional, but 
without declaring that the anti-mask ordinance was a content-based 
 
 271 Id. at 840. 
 272 Id. at 838. 
 273 See id. 
 274 Id. at 840 (quoting Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960)) (citing McIntyre 
v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); 
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)). 
 275 See id. at 844. 
 276 Id. at 842. 
 277 Id.  
 278 See id. at 842; see also Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 93–94 (1978) (finding no 
concrete facts that the demonstrators should have feared violence as the demonstration 
was peaceful). 
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regulation.279  The district court granted in part and denied in part 
the Klan’s request for permanent injunctive relief.280  The city’s 
ordinance imposed criminal penalties for concealing one’s identity 
in a public place, when coupled with certain intent requirements.281 
The court decided that the Klan’s hoods constituted a form of 
protected symbolic speech.282  However, unlike the district court in 
Goshen, this district court did not find that the city’s anti-mask 
ordinance was content-based.283  The ordinance regulated conduct.  
The court explained that the ordinance’s requirement of different 
kinds of intent contemplated affirmative conduct of some kind, and 
that affirmative conduct could itself be legitimately proscribed by 
the government.284  Where the ordinance regulated mask-wearing 
with the intent to avoid identification, no additional affirmative 
conduct was required but the government could still regulate 
because of its legitimate interest.285 
However, the court took issue with the section of the ordinance 
that prohibited the wearing of a mask “with the intent to intimidate, 
threaten, abuse or harass any other person.”286  The court found 
this section problematic from a First Amendment perspective 
because an individual could violate it “by engaging in protected 
First Amendment activity while wearing a mask.”287  Thus, the 
court found the ordinance overbroad on its face, and 
unconstitutionally vague.288 
In summary, courts finding anti-mask statutes problematic have 
done so under a variety of justifications.  Some focus on mask-
wearing as symbolic speech.  Others focus on the nexus between 
anonymity and freedom of expression.  A number of courts find 
the statutes facially overbroad or vague. 
 
 279 Church of the Am. Ku Klux Klan v. City of Erie, 99 F. Supp.2d 583 (W.D. Pa. 
2000). 
 280 Id. at 585. 
 281 Id. 
 282 See id. at 587. 
 283 See id. 
 284 Id. at 589. 
 285 See id. at 591. 
 286 Id. 
 287 Id. 
 288 Id. at 592. 
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Courts do not always require challengers to make a showing of 
retaliation; they often infer from the circumstances that the 
petitioners’ fear of retaliation is viable.  Courts rejecting anti-mask 
statutes often instead require the state to prove a connection 
between anonymity and bad behavior, in order to show a 
substantial government interest in regulating anonymity.  Where 
the state fails to make that showing, the statute is found 
unconstitutional.  Finally, one district court in Goshen found that 
an anti-mask statute regulates content rather than conduct, and thus 
merits strict scrutiny. 
These cases show, apart from Goshen, that arguing over 
McIntyre is almost beside the point.  Courts have recognized First 
Amendment values to anonymity long before McIntyre, and 
continually refer to the anonymity protection established in Talley.  
Anonymity can have a significant nexus with free expression, 
freedom of association, and freedom of distribution; and the masks 
themselves may be symbolic speech.  Second, these courts do not 
presume that anonymity is evil in and of itself.  The state must 
make a showing of an additional state interest beyond preventing 
anonymity for the regulations to be constitutional.  Third, courts do 
not always require a showing of retaliation in order to find that 
there might be a chilling effect. 
3. Cases Upholding Anti-Mask Laws 
The previous subsection showed that both state and federal 
courts have overturned anti-mask laws and ordinances in 
California, Florida, Texas, Tennessee, Indiana, and Ohio.289  An 
equally significant number of courts have, however, upheld anti-
mask statutes against constitutional challenges. 
Most courts upholding anti-mask regulations begin with a 
finding that the anti-mask statute regulates conduct, not speech.  
Some find that the mask-wearing at issue is not symbolic speech 
 
 289 See Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d 835, 840 
(N.D. Ind. 1999); Ku Klux Klan v. MLK Worshippers, 735 F. Supp. 745, 751 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1990); Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 94 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Robinson v. State, 
393 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. 1981); Dayton v. Esrati, 707 N.E.2d 1140, 1144–47 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1997); Ghafari v. Mun. Ct. for the S.F. Jud. Dist. of S.F., 87 Cal. App. 3d 255, 
259 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). 
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because it fails to convey a particularized message, or because 
other portions of the costume can convey the same message 
without a need for the mask. 
Some of these cases recognize the possibility of a nexus 
between anonymity and expression, independent of symbolic 
speech, but explain that the defendants failed to show a viable fear 
of retaliation and thus failed to establish that nexus.  A few cases 
note that anonymity is expressive but is inherently threatening and 
thus the state interest in banning it is high.  However, it is 
important to note that even those cases that uphold anti-mask laws 
often do so by narrowing the statutes’ scope. 
Courts have upheld anti-mask statutes and ordinances in New 
York, Georgia, the Seventh Circuit, and Virginia.  The New York 
case law is the most substantial, culminating in a recent Second 
Circuit case. 
The New York anti-mask law is a general anti-mask law, 
banning the wearing of masks with exceptions for protected 
conduct.290  It is one of the earliest anti-mask laws, and was 
originally enacted in 1845 to address anti-rent protestors who 
dressed as “Indians” while rioting.  The protesters killed several 
law enforcement officers who attempted to serve writs on them, 
prompting legislation.291 
The New York law bans being disguised, with exceptions, 
including an exception for entertainment.  Individuals who are 
peacefully assembled for entertainment are permitted to obtain a 
permit from the police to wear masks or disguise themselves in 
public.292  In the 1967 case Schumann v. State of New York, the 
district court refused to grant a temporary injunction against 
enforcement of the New York anti-mask law, explaining that the 
plaintiffs, a pantomime theater group protesting U.S. involvement 
in war, had never actually applied for a permit exempting 
themselves from the statute’s coverage.293 
 
 290 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.45(4) (McKinney 2010).  
 291 People v. Aboaf, 721 N.Y.S.2d 725, 733 (N.Y. Crim. Ct 2001). 
 292 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(4) (McKinney 1989). 
 293 270 F. Supp. 730, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
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In the 2001 case People v. Aboaf, a New York trial court found 
that New York’s anti-mask law was constitutional, but subjected 
the law to a limiting construction.294  The defendants in Aboaf were 
self-described anarchists arrested while participating in a 
demonstration in Union Square Park, wearing bandanas covering 
their faces except for the eyes and forehead.295  The court first 
stated that the New York anti-mask law clearly regulates conduct, 
not speech.296  It then explained that to successfully make a First 
Amendment challenge under freedom of association, the 
defendants must show undisputed evidence that establishes “the 
requisite nexus between compelled disclosure of the identities of 
individuals and resulting recriminations.”297  Because the 
defendants had failed to show evidence of a pattern of harassment 
that would be mitigated through anonymity, the court found that 
they could not link their anonymity to freedom of association.  By 
requiring the defendants to show a pattern of harassment, however, 
the New York court departed from what other courts did earlier in 
Aryan and Ghafari. 
Despite finding that freedom of association had not been 
implicated in this case, the court recognized that the New York 
anti-mask statute might be overbroad.  To avoid First Amendment 
problems, the Aboaf court construed the law to prohibit the 
wearing of masks when done “for no legitimate purpose.”298  The 
court recognized that a mask can be worn “for communicative 
purposes” (symbolic speech), and that anonymity can be “a 
necessary corollary to freedom of association.”299  The court thus 
recognized that mask-wearing could implicate the First 
Amendment as symbolic speech, or when anonymity has a nexus 
with free expression.  To protect both of these types of expression, 
the court limited the New York law to apply only to the wearing of 
masks when not done for a legitimate purpose. 
 
 294 Aboaf, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 734 (holding that New York’s anti-mask statute was not 
overbroad or unconstitutional as applied). 
 295 Id. at 727. 
 296 Id. at 728. 
 297 Id. at 729 (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Hall-Tyner Election Campaign 
Committee, 678 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
 298 Id. at 733. 
 299 Id. 
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Three years later, in the first anti-mask state law to reach a 
Court of Appeals, the Second Circuit upheld New York’s anti-
mask law in Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik.300  Ku Klux Klan members 
applied for a parade permit, and were informed by the police 
department that their plan to wear masks would violate New 
York’s anti-mask law.301  The Second Circuit found that the mask-
wearing at issue was not symbolic speech.302  The Second Circuit 
explained that here, the expressive force of the mask was 
redundant with the costume.303  Because the mask had no 
independent expressive value from the rest of the KKK uniform, 
the mask was not symbolic speech. 
In addition to this narrow holding, the Second Circuit 
evidenced a broad limited interpretation of the First Amendment 
right to anonymous speech.304  The court narrowly interpreted the 
First Amendment right to anonymity established by the Supreme 
Court in NAACP, Talley, and McIntyre as a right only against the 
compelled disclosure of one’s name.305  The Second Circuit 
explained that the Supreme Court “never held that freedom of 
association or the right to engage in anonymous speech entails a 
right to conceal one’s appearance in a public demonstration.”306  It 
explicitly rejected the argument “that the First Amendment is 
implicated every time a law makes someone—including a member 
of a politically unpopular group—less willing to exercise his or her 
free speech rights.”307 
 
 300 See Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 211 (2d 
Cir. 2004). 
 301 Id. at 200. 
 302 See id. at 205. 
 303 See id. at 206, 208 (“[M]erely that where, as here, a statute banning conduct imposes 
a burden on the wearing of an element of an expressive uniform, which element has no 
independent or incremental expressive value, the First Amendment is not implicated, and 
a balancing of interests under United States v. O’Brien . . . is unnecessary.”) (citing 
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). 
 304 See id. at 209. 
 305 See id. at 208 (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); 
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)). 
 306 Id. at 209. 
 307 Id. 
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This second point reaches further than any cases before it.308  It 
ignores the overbreadth and vagueness worries addressed by other 
courts.309  And it ignores the “nexus between anonymity and 
expression” observed in both Aryan and Ghafari.310  Limiting 
Supreme Court case law to the disclosure of names rather than 
identity also ignores the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Talley.  In 
Talley, the Supreme Court explicitly connected anonymity to the 
First Amendment by explaining that public discussion could be 
deterred through “identification and fear of reprisal.”311  Facial 
recognition can be equivalent to compelling the disclosure of a 
name; identification can often be made with a face as easily as 
through a name, especially in an age of biometric scanning and 
facial recognition software. 
After Kerik, the New York Supreme Court considered the 
appeal of eleven defendants from Aboaf in People v. Bull.312  The 
court noted that Kerik controlled, so the “defendants’ constitutional 
overbreadth and vagueness arguments” both failed.313  The court 
also pointed out that the trial court’s ruling in Aboaf that limited 
the New York statute to the wearing of masks “for no legitimate 
purpose” had been overruled by Kerik.314 
At the core of the Second Circuit decision in Kerik was its 
strange conclusion that mask-wearing was not symbolic speech.315  
The Second Circuit took its reasoning from a 1992 district court 
case from the Eastern District of Virginia.316  This case, Hernandez 
v. Superintendent, is important because it created the Kerik way of 
analyzing whether mask-wearing is expressive conduct. 
 
 308 See id. (holding that “the plaintiffs’ right to anonymous speech is not implicated”). 
 309 See State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 673–74 (1990). 
 310 Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 92 (1978); see also Ghafari v. Mun. Ct. for S.F. 
Jud. Dist. of S.F., 87 Cal. App. 3d 255, 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)  
 311 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960). 
 312 People v. Bull, 784 N.Y.S.2d 270, 272 (Sup. Ct. NY 2004). 
 313 Id. 
 314 Id. (citing People v. Aboaf, 187 Misc. 2s 173 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct., 2001)) aff’d sub 
nom. People v. Bull, 784 N.Y.S.2d 270). 
 315 Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 207 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (citing Hernandez v. Superintendent, 800 F. Supp. 1344, 1351 (E.D. Va. 
1992)). 
 316 Hernandez, 800 F. Supp. at 1353. 
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Like the Second Circuit in Kerik, the Virginia district court 
held in Hernandez v. Superintendent that mask-wearing by the Ku 
Klux Klan was not expressive conduct.317  The court explained that 
the burden rests on the petitioner to demonstrate that the conduct is 
in fact symbolic speech, and here the petitioner failed.318  The 
court found that the detachable mask was an optional part of the 
Klan uniform; the petitioner’s companion was not wearing the 
mask, and the petitioner could not articulate a particularized 
message, saying only that the mask was “part of the symbolic 
symbol of the Klan.”319  The court found that because the mask 
contributed nothing to the message already conveyed by the rest of 
the Klan costume, it did not convey a particularized message.320 
This is a strange reading of the O’Brien test.  A “particularized 
message” does not mean a “nonredundant message.”  For example, 
if one wears a t-shirt with a picture of a peace sign, and a hat with 
the same image, there is nothing in O’Brien to indicate that each 
piece of clothing would not be separately protected by the First 
Amendment.  The Hernandez court and Kerik court strangely 
appear to import the time, place, and manner test’s requirement 
that regulation leave an alternative avenue for expression.321  The 
Hernandez court reasoned that because the message in the Klan 
mask could be expressed in an alternate method—through the rest 
of the costume—the mask itself was not expressive conduct.322  
This has never, however, been the standard for expressive conduct.  
For First-Amendment-protected expression, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Cohen v. California makes it clear that the specific 
means of communication is protected because the speaker’s choice 
of medium itself is often expressive.323 
 
 317 Id. at 1351. 
 318 Id. at 1350. 
 319 Id.  
 320 Id. at 1351. 
 321 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (noting 
that time, place and manner restrictions must be “content-neutral . . . [and] narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative 
channels of communication”) (citations omitted). 
 322 Hernandez, 800 F. Supp. at 1351. 
 323 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
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Georgia courts took a different approach to upholding anti-
mask laws.  Instead of declaring that mask-wearing was not 
symbolic speech, as did New York and Virginia, Georgia courts 
found that mask-wearing can constitute expression unworthy of 
First Amendment protection when it puts the viewer in a state of 
legitimate fear.  Thus Georgia courts have limited the general anti-
mask statute to apply only when mask-wearing provokes “a 
reasonable apprehension of intimidation, threats or violence.”324 
The Supreme Court of Georgia in State v. Miller in 1990 found 
that the Georgia anti-mask statute did not violate the First or 
Fourteenth Amendments.325  The Georgia statute, established in 
1951 after increased threats from the Ku Klux Klan,326 was a 
general anti-mask statute with exceptions and no evident intent 
requirement.327  Despite finding the statute constitutional, the court 
narrowed it by reading in a requirement of intent to conceal one’s 
identity and restricting the statute’s application to circumstances 
where the mask-wearing provoked fear. 
The court explained that while “under certain circumstances, 
anonymity may be essential to the exercise of constitutional 
rights,” anonymity has also been assumed for bad purposes.328  
Thus, “[a]nonymity is neither an absolute social good, nor an 
absolute constitutional right.”329 
The court found the statute to be content-neutral because it 
proscribed “a certain form of menacing conduct.”330  If Klan 
members could show that they experienced reprisals when their 
identities were revealed, they could show that the anti-mask law 
impacted their freedom of expression.  But the Klan here failed to 
show proof of reprisals against its members.331 
 
 324 State v. Miller, 398 S.E. 2d 547, 552 (Ga. 1990). 
 325 Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 552–53. 
 326 Id. at 550. 
 327 Id. at 556 (Smith, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion does not require 
criminal intent for conviction under the Georgia anti-mask statute).  
 328 Id. at 552. 
 329 Id.  
 330 Id. at 551. 
 331 Id. (holding that “the record in this case is devoid of any proof of any injury to or 
loss of a job by members of the Klan”). 
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The court did not base its decision, however, on the conclusion 
that mask-wearing is not expressive conduct.332  Instead, it 
“assume[d] without deciding that Miller’s wearing a mask was 
conduct ‘sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to 
implicate the First Amendment.’”333  But even under that 
assumption, the state’s interest in anonymity’s functionality and 
the negative nature of anonymity overrode any First Amendment 
interest by the Klan.  The court concluded that anonymity in 
general is a bad thing, deserving of regulation by the state.334  “A 
nameless, faceless figure strikes terror in the human heart. . .The 
face betrays not only identity, but also human frailty.”335  Based on 
this understanding of anonymity, the Miller court narrowed 
Georgia’s general anti-mask statute into a new type of anti-mask 
statute.  The Georgia statute, after Miller, is directed specifically at 
“intimidating or threatening mask-wearing behavior” with intent to 
conceal identity.336 
Since Miller, two things have happened to alter Georgia case 
law.  First, Georgia readdressed the statute in Daniels v. State in 
1994, and further narrowed its construction.337  Second, the 
Supreme Court came down with a more restrictive First 
Amendment standard for regulating threats in Virginia v. Black in 
2003 that impacts the viability of the Georgia interpretation.338 
 
 332 Id. at 549–50 (finding that the Anti-Mask Act statute was supported by a valid 
government interest, the Court did not need to decide whether appellant’s mask-wearing 
constituted symbolic speech). 
 333 Id. at 550 n.2 (quoting State v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2540 (1989)). 
 334 See id. at 552 (“[A]nonymity has often been assumed for the most pernicious 
purposes. Anonymity is [not] an absolute social good.”); id. at 551 (“The state’s interests 
furthered by the Anti-Mask Act lie at the very heart of the realm of legitimate 
governmental activity.”). 
 335 Id. at 550. 
 336 See id. at 553. 
 337 Daniels v. State, 448 S.E.2d 185, 188–89 (Ga. 1994) (holding that conviction under 
the Georgia anti-mask statute required not only intent to conceal one’s identity as 
required by Miller, but additionally the intent to threaten, intimidate, or provoke the 
apprehension of violence.  This added requirement thus narrowed the scope of the 
statute). 
 338 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (holding that, with regard to the First 
Amendment, a state may permissibly regulate “statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a 
particular individual or group of individuals”). 
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In the 1994 case Daniels v. State, the Supreme Court of 
Georgia returned to the anti-mask statute addressed in Miller.339  
Daniels, who lived on his Social Security income and collected and 
recycled aluminum cans as a supplemental form of income, found 
a discarded football helmet and green wrestling mask in the trash 
and wore them to entertain neighborhood children playing in the 
street.340  A police officer arrested Daniels because he witnessed 
Daniels wearing the mask while addressing two young girls.341  
Daniels argued that the state had failed to produce evidence 
sufficient to convict, and the court agreed.342 
The court returned to the Miller construction of the Georgia 
anti-mask law, which required proof of intent to conceal identity, 
and applied only to mask-wearing conduct that provokes a 
reasonable apprehension of intimidation, threats, or violence.343  
The court in Daniels restated Miller to criminalize mask-wearing 
that the wearer knows provokes a reasonable apprehension of 
intimidation, threats, or violence; or mask-wearing when the 
wearer has been criminally negligent with respect to creating that 
same fear.  The court explained that the accused must (1) intend to 
conceal his or her identity, and (2) either intend to threaten, 
intimidate, or provoke the apprehension of violence, or be 
criminally negligent of the same.344  Because all evidence pointed 
to the fact that Daniels intended to entertain his subjects rather than 
intimidate or threaten them, the state had produced insufficient 
evidence to convict him under the statute.345 
Presumably, Miller must also be affected by the Supreme 
Court’s 2003 decision on cross-burning and true threats in Virginia 
v. Black.  The Supreme Court held that for regulation of a threat to 
be constitutional, the threat must be a “true threat.”346  A true threat 
consists of “a threat [directed] to a person or group of persons with 
 
 339 Daniels, 448 S.E.2d at 187.  
 340 Id. at 186. 
 341 Id. 
 342 Id. at 187. 
 343 Id. (quoting State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 552 (Ga. 1990)). 
 344 Id. at 189. 
 345 Id. 
 346 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 
705, 708 (1969) (per curiam)). 
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the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”347  
Thus the “intimidating or threatening mask-wearing behavior”348 
banned in Miller must be intended to make the threatened person 
fear bodily harm or death.349  It is unlikely that much mask-
wearing causes people to fear bodily harm or death. 
Nonetheless, this idea that there is a legitimate state interest in 
banning anonymity because anonymity is inherently frightening 
received traction in other courts as well.  The Seventh Circuit 
considered the constitutionality of an anti-mask rule in Ryan v. 
County of DuPage.350  The defendant Ryan challenged a rule 
against wearing masks in a local courthouse.351  Ryan had entered 
the courthouse wearing an air filtration mask as an act of protest, 
because bad air quality had previously resulted in closure of the 
courthouse due to workers falling ill.352  The Seventh Circuit first 
explained that “[t]he wearing of a mask inside a courthouse implies 
intimidation.”353  Anonymity itself communicates a threat.354  Then 
the Seventh Circuit pointed out that Ryan never explained a 
particularized message attached to the mask; he had said that he 
was wearing it for medical reasons.355 
The Seventh Circuit in Ryan reviewed previous anti-mask 
cases.356  It conceded that previous courts appeared divided over 
whether prohibitions against being masked in a public place violate 
the First Amendment.357  The Seventh Circuit explained, however, 
that none of these cases suggested that prohibiting masks within a 
courthouse was constitutionally questionable.358  In an attempt to 
resolve the existing conflict, the court reasoned that the previous 
cases that had found anti-mask statutes to be unconstitutional–
 
 347 Id. at 360. 
 348 Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 553. 
 349 Black, 538 U.S. at 360. 
 350 45 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 351 Id. at 1092. 
 352 Id. at 1091. 
 353 Id. at 1092. 
 354 Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 669, 673 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). 
 355 Ryan, 45 F.3d at 1093. 
 356 See id. at 1095. 
 357 Id. 
 358 Id. at 1096. 
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Ghafari and Aryan—involved individuals who feared violent 
retaliation if they were not masked.359  Thus the Seventh Circuit 
rejected Ryan’s claim for three reasons: the mask was not symbolic 
speech, there was no proven nexus between anonymity and 
freedom of association, and anonymity communicates intimidation 
to viewers. 
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals also considered 
anonymity’s inherently intimidating nature.360  In 1996, the court 
concluded in State v. Berrill that the West Virginia anti-mask 
statute had been constitutionally applied.361  West Virginia has a 
general mask statute, with exceptions.362  To convince a board of 
education to change the high school red devil mascot, Mr. Berill 
attended a county board meeting dressed in a devil costume with a 
mask.363  Witnesses from the meeting said they were frightened.364 
The Berill court primarily followed the reasoning in Miller.365  
It quoted Miller for the proposition that masking itself is inherently 
frightening.366  It also pointed out that the focus of the statute is 
conduct: the statute bans “the concealment of identity, and any 
limitation on speech [was] merely a secondary effect.”367  The 
court explained that Berrill had “alternate” means for “articulating 
his concerns that would not have concealed his identity and thus 
violated the statute.”368  Finally, the court pointed out that Berrill’s 
message resulted in “chaos [rather] than understanding,” so it was 
not a particularized message likely to be understood.369 
Thus courts have upheld the constitutionality of anti-mask 
statutes in New York, Virginia, West Virginia, Georgia; and the 
Seventh Circuit found an anti-mask regulation in a courthouse to 
be constitutional.  These courts have upheld these anti-mask laws 
 
 359 Id. at 1095. 
 360 See State v. Berrill, 474 S.E.2d 508 (W. Va. 1996). 
 361 See id. at 509. 
 362 See W. VA. CODE § 61-6-22 (1992). 
 363 See Berrill, 474 S.E.2d at 509. 
 364 See id. at 510. 
 365 See id. at 514–15. 
 366 See id. 
 367 Id. at 515. 
 368 Id. 
 369 Id. at 516. 
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by finding that the statutes regulate conduct, not speech; that mask-
wearing is not sufficiently expressive; or that defendants fail to 
show a nexus between anonymity and protected expression or 
association.  However, it is striking that a number of these cases do 
attempt to limit the scope of the anti-mask statutes.  Georgia 
employed a narrowing interpretation, and a New York trial court 
did so as well.  The Second Circuit decision in Kerik may be the 
most prominent anti-mask case, but it also appears to be an outlier 
in its decision that the Supreme Court protection for anonymity is 
limited to compelled disclosures of names. 
4. Is Masking Inherently Bad?  Other Cases on Intent 
In a number of these cases, the question is raised of whether 
being masked is by itself inherently bad, or whether a defendant 
must have an additional intent to conceal herself or do some 
additional bad thing.  Even the difference in the types of state 
statutes reflects this tension between different conceptions of 
anonymity.  As we saw in Miller and Daniels, Georgia courts have 
read in several additional elements of intent.370  The district court 
in City of Erie explained that intent must be illustrated by 
conduct.371  By contrast, Hernandez, Ryan, and Kerik all described 
mask-wearing as inherently threatening and not requiring 
additional intent.372 
Two additional cases about masks address intent in interesting 
ways, though these cases do not address First Amendment claims.  
In State v. Bryant, the Supreme Court of Tennessee struggled with 
the state’s law dictating that masked entrance onto private property 
shall be considered prima facie evidence of the accused’s intention 
to commit a felony.373  The court held that the statute’s creation of 
prima facie evidence was permissive only, not a mandatory 
presumption.374  Permissive inference is unconstitutional as applied 
 
 370 See Daniels v. State, 448 S.E.2d 185, 188 (Ga. 1994); State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 
673 (1990).  
 371 See Church of the Am. Ku Klux Klan v. City of Erie, 99 F. Supp.2d 583, 591 (W.D. 
Pa. 2000). 
 372 See Kerik, 356 F.3d at 205–06; 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1995); Hernandez v. 
Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 669, 673 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). 
 373 State v. Bryant, 585 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Sup. Ct. Tenn. 1979). 
 374 See id. 
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to a given defendant only if it is irrational for the juror to find the 
presumed fact.375  So the statute was not unconstitutional on its 
face; it was just a question of whether it was constitutional as 
applied.376  The court then explained that the jury instructions must 
make clear that the jury may, but need not, draw the inference 
suggested by the statute.377  Since the jury instructions did not 
make this clear, the court reversed and remanded.378  This holding 
shows that a jury cannot be told that masked entrance onto a 
property always means the accused intended to commit a felony; 
the jury must be told that they are allowed but not required to make 
that presumption about the accused’s intent. 
A more recent Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Santos, 
explained that intent to disguise oneself was a required element of 
a Massachusetts statute in which wearing a mask is an aggravating 
factor to the crime of armed or unarmed robbery.379  The court 
considered whether evidence had been insufficient for a juror to 
find that the defendant had been “masked” or “disguised.”380  The 
defendant had been wearing a baseball hat and sunglasses, and a 
band-aid on his face.381  The court found that the question should 
not have been put to the jury, because what the defendant was 
wearing did “not suggest or even remotely imply an intention or 
conscious effort to conceal identity.”382  This case shows 
consistency with earlier mask cases, in finding that one must 
intend to be disguised to be convicted under anti-mask laws, and 
shows that sometimes there is a burden on the state to establish that 
intent. 
C. Conclusions about Anti-Mask Cases 
The case law on anti-mask laws teaches us a number of things 
that we can bring into the context of online speech.  First, courts 
recognized First Amendment values in anonymity before McIntyre, 
 
 375 See id. 
 376 See id. 
 377 See id. at 589–90. 
 378 See id. at 590. 
 379 Commonwealth v. Santos, 672 N.E.2d 562, 564 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). 
 380 See id. 
 381 See id. 
 382 Id. at 564. 
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under Talley.  Anonymity as a function can have a nexus with free 
expression, and masks can be symbolic speech. 
Second, it is not clear that courts always require an actual 
showing of reprisals for anonymity to be considered to have a 
substantial nexus with free expression.  The 1978 cases of Aryan 
and Ghafari did not require a showing of reprisals.383  They 
allowed the courts to assume that the chilling effect would occur, 
based on claims made by the appellants and not refuted by the state 
or a university.384  Other courts do require evidence, but there is by 
no means a consistent requirement. 
Third, the cases evidence a variety of underlying intuitions 
about anonymity and mask-wearing.  These reactions range from a 
statement that anonymity does not per se adversely affect any 
legitimate state interest in Ghafari, to observing that mask-wearing 
inherently creates a climate of fear, in Miller.385  The underlying 
understanding of the nature of anonymity is frequently the basis for 
whether additional intent is required.  However, after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Virginia v. Black, it is clear that a state cannot 
regulate mask-wearing solely because it is frightening to other 
people.386 
Fourth, courts handle the division between anonymity’s 
functional aspects and communicative aspects interestingly.387  The 
First Amendment claim does not hinge solely on whether the mask 
is expressive conduct.388  In Aryan, the fact that masks serve a 
function actually did not destroy the First Amendment argument; it 
bolstered it.389  Because mask-wearing permits free speech and 
association, it is protected under NAACP.390  But the functional 
 
 383 See Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 93–94 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Ghafari v. Mun. 
Ct. for S.F. Jud. Dist. of S.F., 87 Cal. App. 3d 255, 261 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). 
 384 See Aryan, 462 F. Supp. at 93–94; Ghafari, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 261. 
 385 See State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 672 (Ga. 1990); Ghafari, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 262. 
 386 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362 (2003) (finding that a statute banning cross 
burning with intent to intimidate does not violate the First Amendment). 
 387 See, e.g., Aryan, 462 F. Supp. at 92. 
 388 See id. at 92. 
 389 See id. 
 390 See id. at 91 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958)). 
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element of anonymity is used in other cases to justify not applying 
the First Amendment at all.391 
Finally, it is worth noting how widely the splits between courts 
are developing.  Both state and federal courts have declared the 
anti-mask laws of California, Florida, and Texas 
unconstitutional.392  City ordinances have also been overturned, in 
Tennessee and Indiana.393  Georgia’s statute has been upheld, but 
with a vastly limiting construction that may now turn out after 
Virginia v. Black to prevent the application of the law entirely.394  
However, the Second Circuit refused to extend the right to 
anonymity past disclosure requirements by the state, and described 
anti-mask laws as regulating function, only.395  And the Eastern 
District of Virginia agreed.396 
IV. ANTI-MASK CASE LAW APPLIED TO REAL NAME POLICIES 
ONLINE 
This Part brings lessons from the real world into the discussion 
of anonymity online.  The Supreme Court has established that 
door-to-door petitioners may not be subject to identity registration 
requirements in the real world.397  The question is whether this rule 
changes online, where speech can be truly untraceable.398  
Untraceable online speech implicates a strong state interest in law 
enforcement, arguably stronger than the state’s interest in 
registering door-to-door petitioners offline.  Could the government 
in the United States constitutionally require that all online speakers 
 
 391 See, e.g., State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 552–53 (Ga. 1990). 
 392 See Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 94 (N.D. Tex.1978); Robinson v. State, 393 
So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. 1981); Ghafari v. Mun. Ct. for the S.F. Jud. Dist. of S.F., 87 Cal. 
App. 3d 255, 259 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). 
 393 See Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d 835, 840 
(N.D. Ind. 1999); Ku Klux Klan v. MLK Worshippers, 735 F. Supp. 745, 751 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1990). 
 394 See Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 550. 
 395 See Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 208 (2d 
Cir. 2004). 
 396 See Hernandez v. Superintendent, 800 F.Supp. 1344, 1351 (E.D. Va. 1992). 
 397 See Watchtower Bible v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 168 (2002); Talley v. 
California, 362 U.S. 60, 63 (1960). 
 398 See Brenner, supra note 184, at 4. 
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register their identities, justifying that registration requirement with 
a strong state interest in law enforcement? 
This question is not merely a hypothetical; online real name 
policies have received considerable attention from governments in 
recent years, even in the United States.  This Part addresses online 
real name policies, and asks whether the Doe literature addresses 
them.  Concluding that the Doe scholarship does not adequately 
address the prospect of online real name policies, this Part brings 
to bear the anti-mask case law discussed in Part III. 
A. Real Name Policies 
Online real-name policies require self-identification while 
speaking, or the registration of identity with either the government 
or some layer in the communicative infrastructure such as an 
Internet Service Provider (ISP).  These policies vary in whether 
they primarily address traceability, or directly prohibit anonymity. 
Policies that prohibit anonymity apply to all layers of the 
communication stack: the individual cannot speak without self-
identifying to everyone.  Policies that address traceability do not 
mandate that an individual speak under his real name; instead, they 
require the individual to register identity with at least one party, so 
that if he commits a crime or a tort, law enforcement will be able 
to find him.  The Tor-enabled “Silk Road” of illicit anonymous 
online activities has prompted much discussion of banning 
untraceable anonymity in the interest of preventing terrorism and 
other crimes.399 
In 2003, South Korea began enacting real name commenting 
laws, which were first applied on political websites.400  The South 
Korean government enacted these laws in the name of increasing 
civility, and preventing harm to individuals from insidious 
 
 399 See Nicolas Christin, Traveling the Silk Road: A Measurement Analysis of a Large 
Anonymous Online Marketplace (Carnegie Mellon University Working Paper, 2012), 
available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.7139 (arguing that illegal Internet marketplaces, 
frequented by anonymous users, make it difficult for law enforcement agents to track the 
purchasing of weapons and narcotics). 
 400 Gregory Ferenstein, Surprisingly Good Evidence that Real Name Policies Fail to 
Improve Comments, TECHCRUNCH (July 29, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/ 
07/29/surprisingly-good-evidence-that-real-name-policies-fail-to-improve-comments. 
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anonymous comments.401  In 2007, South Korea temporarily 
required that all websites of a certain size mandate the use of real 
names by their viewers and commenters.402  Users were required to 
verify their identities by submitting their Resident Registration 
Numbers (RRNs), which are roughly equivalent to social security 
numbers.403  The policy proved to have surprisingly little impact 
on cleaning up abusive commentary—a change of .09%, in a study 
done by the Korean Communications Commission.404  But it 
resulted in a security breach in which identity information for 
thirty-five million users was stolen from two popular websites.405  
South Korea decided to abandon the “real-name system” in August 
2011.406 
In early 2012, China decided to expand its online 
accountability regulations, requiring users of microblogging 
services to use their own names.407  Unlike in South Korea, this 
policy does not require a user to display her real name while 
speaking.408  Instead, the user’s national identification information 
is stored in her account.409  China’s policy is an example of a real-
name policy targeting dissidents, but not civility.410  Some argue 
that while this identification requirement is bad, it may be better 
than the other alternative, which is banning the technology of 
microblogging altogether.411 
 
 401 Id. 
 402 Timothy Lee, South Korea’s “Real Names” Debacle and the Virtues of Online 
Anonymity, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 15, 2011, 02:45 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2011/08/what-south-korea-can-teach-us-about-online-anonymity. 
 403 Id. 
 404 Ferenstein, supra note 400. 
 405 Xeni Jardin, South Korea to Abandon “Real Name” Internet Policy, BOING BOING 
(Aug. 12, 2012, 12:09 AM), http://boingboing.net/2011/08/12/south-korea-to-abandon-
real-name-internet-policy.html. 
 406 Id. 
 407 J. Angelo Racoma, China to Enforce Real Name Policy for Microblogging, 
Claiming “Online Accountability, CMSWIRE (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://www.cmswire.com/cms/social-business/china-to-enforce-real-name-policy-for-
microblogging-claiming-online-accountability-014211.php. 
 408 Id. 
 409 Id. 
 410 Id. 
 411 J. Angelo Racoma, China to Enforce Real Name Policy for Microblogging, 
Claiming “Online Accountability,” CMSWIRE (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.cmswire.com/ 
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Calls for real-name policies are increasingly the routine after 
high-profile criminal acts.  In Germany, the Interior Minister 
argued for real-name policies, alleging that the recent Norwegian 
shooter had been inspired by a pseudonymous anti-Muslim 
blogger.412  In the wake of the recent Aurora, Colorado shooting, 
the AMC theater chain banned masks in their movie theaters.413  
The reasoning was that costumes “make other guests feel 
uncomfortable.”414 
The discussion is playing out in the private sphere as well.  Out 
of a combination of business interests and civility concerns, 
Google+ and Facebook require the use of real names, and 
newspapers are turning to real-name commentary policies.415 
However, the advent of new video obscuring technology 
recognizes the necessity of anonymity for dissident behavior.416  
As we increasingly move towards video as a form of 
communication, online anonymity takes on new forms.  YouTube 
now provides a face-blurring tool for online videos, to protect 
dissidents in oppressive regimes.417  Anti-mask laws may in fact be 
more than an analogue—they may have direct online application to 
the obscuring of identity in online videos. 
The question of state-mandated real-name policies has come up 
several times in the United States.  Mandatory key escrow was 
discussed during the Clinton era, in debate over the controversial 
Clipper Chip.418  Froomkin pointed out that mandatory key escrow 
would chill “speech by persons who seek to remain either secure or 
 
cms/social-business/china-to-enforce-real-name-policy-for-microblogging-claiming-
online-accountability-014211.php?pageNum=2. 
 412 Lee, supra note 402. 
 413 AMC Bans Masks, Fake Weapons in Theaters, CBSCHICAGO (July 20, 2012), 
http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2012/07/20/amc-bans-masks-fake-weapons-in-theaters. 
 414 Id. 
 415 Kaminski, supra note 29, at 14. 
 416 Eyder Peralta, To Help Dissidents, YouTube Introduces Face-Blurring Tool, NPR 
(July 18, 2012), http://m.npr.org/news/Technology/156987232. 
 417 Neal Ungerleider, YouTube Introduces Face-Blurring Tool, FAST COMPANY (July 
18, 2012), http://www.fastcompany.com/1843123/youtube-introduces-face-blurring-tool. 
 418 See Froomkin, The Clipperchip, supra note 202, at 809.   
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anonymous when speaking, whether for fear of retribution or other 
reasons.”419 
More recently, two identical New York legislative proposals—
Senate Bill 6779 and Assembly Bill 8688—would require web 
administrators to take down any online postings to which the writer 
has not attached his name.420  If the anonymous poster agrees to 
attach his or her name and confirms the accuracy of his or her IP 
address and home address, then the posting can remain up.421 
The New York laws may have been proposed by referring to an 
anti-mask case.  As discussed above, in Kerik, the Second Circuit 
held that wearing a mask was not protected by the First 
Amendment.422  The New York legislature may have reasoned that 
the two online real name policy proposals would be constitutional, 
relying on Kerik. 
B. The Doe Literature 
Most scholarly work on online anonymity does not address real 
name policies; it concerns the establishment of a standard for 
unmasking online defendants through the civil subpoena process.  
Cases about this standard are often referred to as Doe or Dendrite 
cases, after an early New Jersey case that established a prominent 
version of the subpoena standard.423 
In a Doe case, a civil plaintiff argues to the court that their case 
necessitates the revelation of the identity of the anonymous 
defendant.424  The process usually involves two steps of 
subpoenas: one to the Online Service Provider (OSP), or website, 
to get the identifying number (or Internet Protocol address) used by 
 
 419 Id. at 813. 
 420 See Gene Policinski, N.Y. Bills Would Squelch Anonymity Online, FIRST 
AMENDMENT CENTER (May 24, 2012), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/n-y-bills-
would-squelch-anonymity-online. 
 421 Tecca, N.Y Senate Bill Seeks to End Anonymous Internet Posting, YAHOO! NEWS 
(May 24, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/technology-blog/york-senate-bill-seeks-
end-anonymous-internet-posting-162549128.html. 
 422 See Church of Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 208 (2d 
Cir. 2004). 
 423 Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001). 
 424 See, e.g., Ekstrand, supra note 37, at 405. 
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the anonymous speaker; and a second to the Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) to connect that identifying number with an 
individual’s account and real name.425  The scholarly literature on 
Doe primarily concerns the establishment of an appropriate 
procedural standard for these unmaskings, coupled with concern 
that these subpoenas have been used by large companies and others 
to chill defendants’ speech through the subpoena process without 
bringing legitimate cases to fruition.426 
Whatever the disagreements about the details, the consensus 
among scholars is that First Amendment “protections for 
anonymous speech are not absolute.”427  This protection as applied 
to Doe cases has famously been referred to as a “qualified 
privilege.”428 
To understand what this means in the Doe context, it may help 
to look to the different forms of the reporter’s privilege, which has 
been compared by some to the Doe or Dendrite standard.429  A few 
reporter’s shield statutes—including the first such statute, which 
was enacted in Maryland in 1896—provide “an absolute shield to 
reporters from forced disclosure of their confidential sources.”430  
Once the privilege is recognized, a reporter is shielded from 
disclosure “even when subpoenaed to testify before a grand 
jury.”431  However, most state laws provide a qualified reporter’s 
privilege, not an absolute privilege.432  In a typical state shield 
statute, a party may overcome the reporter’s privilege by showing 
that the information “is relevant and material to the unresolved 
issues,” “cannot be obtained from alternative sources,” and that a 
“compelling interest exists for requiring disclosure of the 
information.”433 
 
 425 See Gleicher, supra note 28, at 328. 
 426 See Lidsky, Silencing John Doe, supra note 36, at 859–60. 
 427 Ekstrand, supra note 37, at 407. 
 428 Id. at 425. 
 429 See Hanamirian, supra note 90, at 120, 134. 
 430 Id. at 129. 
 431 Id. 
 432 Id. 
 433 Id. at 130. 
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It took time for the reporter’s privilege standard to be imported 
into the Dendrite context, where it was modified to be arguably 
more protective.434  One scholar suggested using the opinion 
privilege and other First Amendment defenses to protect the 
identity of online John Does accused of libel by big companies.435  
A 2003 article acknowledged that “the new guidelines [used by 
courts] look much like the law of reporter’s privilege.”436  In fact, 
an interview with Paul Levy, the attorney credited with building 
the Dendrite test, indicates that he deliberately crafted the standard 
out of the reporter’s privilege.437  In 2007, two scholars made a 
forceful argument for why the privilege standard should be used in 
the Doe cases.438 
More recent articles have focused on the discrepancy between 
the emerging subpoena standards and attempted to offer a unifying 
standard.  There are between seven and ten recognized tests for 
online John Doe subpoenas.439  Perhaps the most famous, the 
Dendrite test, requires the plaintiff to (1) notify the anonymous 
speaker of the subpoena; (2) identify the allegedly actionable 
speech; and (3) state a prima facie cause of action, producing 
 
 434 Id. at 134 (noting that “[a] recent New Hampshire Supreme Court opinion, 
juxtaposing the Dendrite standard with the state’s qualified reporter’s privilege analysis, 
demonstrates that, at least in the core area of defamation cases, anonymous posters may 
have the legal upper hand”). 
 435 See Lidsky, Silencing John Doe, supra note 36, at 919 (noting that “[t]he First 
Amendment extends a privilege to statements that do not imply an assertion of objective 
fact, either because such statements ‘cannot “reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual 
facts”’ or because such statements are not provably false.  This privilege, the opinion 
privilege, has the potential to protect Internet discourse from wealthy and powerful 
plaintiffs who attempt to use defamation law to intimidate their online critics into 
silence”). 
 436 Ekstrand, supra note 37, at 409. 
 437 Hanamirian, supra note 90, at 121–22 (quoting Paul Levy as having said, “We 
created our [Dendrite] standard out of your source cases”). 
 438 See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1599–1600. 
 439 See, e.g., Gleicher, supra note 28, at 337 (noting that “[o]ver the past decade, courts 
have adopted at least seven standards for evaluating John Doe subpoenas”); see also 
Ashley I. Kissinger & Katharine Larsen, Protections for Anonymous Online Speech, 
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, COURSE HANDBOOK, 815, 826–39 (2011) (surveying legal 
protections for anonymous online speakers and listing over ten distinct tests for 
unmasking an anonymous poster). 
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sufficient evidence to support each element.440  The court then 
balances the strength of the case and the necessity for disclosure 
against the defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous free 
speech.441 
Variations on the Dendrite test operate on at least six axes.442  
These include varying standards of requirements for: notice, 
argument strength, relevance of the identity, specificity on the 
actionable speech, and exhaustion of other resources.443  Some 
courts do not employ a balancing test. 
On the other side of the debate, several scholars have suggested 
that no additional procedural protection is necessary for online 
Does.444 
What is interesting about the Doe or Dendrite scholarship is its 
general consensus that the First Amendment requires a balancing 
test of speech against a prima facie case.  There is little discussion, 
however, of how courts might protect online anonymity outside of 
the subpoena context. 
1. How Past Commentators Have Handled Anti-Mask Laws 
At least three authors writing about online anonymous speech 
have addressed the anti-mask cases.  Most of these treatments, 
however, have been very brief.  Two scholars simply reserved anti-
mask laws for future evaluation, summing up the cases as follows: 
the anti-mask laws “may chill some speech but may conceivably 
be justified as anti-intimidation measures.”445 
Both Froomkin and Susan W. Brenner give more time to anti-
mask cases.  Brenner describes masks as “a good real world 
analogue for anonymity achieved via cyberspace.”446  She explains 
 
 440 See Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001). 
 441 See id. 
 442 Gleicher, supra note 28, at 343 (displaying a chart of cases and the factors weighed 
by each court). 
 443 Id. 
 444 See, e.g., Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants: The Case Against 
Excessive Hand-Wringing over Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REV. 795, 855–56 (2004). 
 445 Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1590 n.237. 
 446 Brenner, supra note 184, at 1. 
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that masks permit a person to conceal identifying information in 
the real world, just as technologies enable identity obfuscation 
online. 
Brenner briefly summarizes anti-mask case law as indicating 
that the First Amendment protects the wearing of masks under two 
circumstances: when “the masks themselves have expressive 
content or whenever ‘there is such a nexus between anonymity and 
speech that a bar on the first is tantamount to a prohibition on the 
second.’”447  As discussed above, the scope of First Amendment 
protection from anti-mask laws is broader; the nexus between 
anonymity and speech need not be as strong as Brenner suggests.   
Courts have used additional justifications for protecting mask-
wearers, by finding that anti-mask laws regulate the content of 
speech, and have found that masks can be symbolic without 
conveying a highly particularized message.448  The spectrum of 
anti-mask law is also more complex, since a number of courts 
chose not to give First Amendment protection to mask-wearing at 
all. 
Brenner suggests that one possible approach to online 
anonymity would be to mimic a particular category of anti-mask 
laws and “criminalize on-line anonymity when it is used, or 
intended to be used, for the purpose of engaging in illegal acts.”449  
This could be done by outlawing the use of online anonymity for 
committing a crime, or by making the use of online anonymity an 
aggravating factor in sentencing.450 
While Brenner’s use of the anti-mask statutes suggests one 
resolution to the problem of regulating anonymity online, it does 
not address the constitutionality of real-name policies.  One could 
extrapolate from Brenner’s summary of the First Amendment 
arguments that online anonymity would be protected only (a) if the 
mask is expressive, or (b) where the speaker can show that banning 
the mask would be equivalent to banning the speech.451  Brenner’s 
analysis does provide one firm conclusion: that a policy penalizing 
 
 447 Id. at 146–47 (quoting Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 92 (N.D. Tex. 1978)). 
 448 See infra Part III.B. 
 449 Brenner, supra note 184, at 147–48. 
 450 Id. at 148–49. 
 451 Id. at 146–47. 
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the use of anonymity for criminal acts only would probably be 
constitutional.452  She does not discuss how this might be done in 
practice. 
There is another aspect worth noting about Brenner’s 
discussion of anti-mask cases.  For Brenner, there is a significant 
difference between online and real-world anonymity.  The central 
question for Brenner is “whether the legal guarantee of anonymity, 
crafted in the context of real world conduct, and the limitations on 
that conduct, should encompass cyberworld conduct that is not 
subject to those limitations.”453 In other words, Brennan believes 
that real-world anonymity is almost always traceable, where online 
anonymity can be untraceable.454  Brenner’s response to the 
question about whether the difference between online and offline 
anonymity matters is to both reject the conclusion that no 
protection should be given to online anonymity, and to reject the 
conclusion that unlimited protection should be given to online 
anonymity.455  She reasons that the best approach is to address the 
use of online anonymity for criminal purposes only; this suggests 
that blanket real-name policies would not be acceptable to her.456 
Froomkin has addressed the strict liability of general anti-mask 
statutes from a legal realist’s perspective.  He points out that the 
Ku Klux Klan often loses, while protesting students win.  Where 
lower courts have upheld anti-mask laws because of the state 
interest in preventing the crimes of violence and intimidation 
associated with mask-wearing, they have balanced a history of 
violence associated with mask-wearers against the First 
Amendment, rather than actual contemporaneous threats.457  
 
 452 Id. (“Treating on-line anonymity as analogous to the wearing of masks in the 
commission of criminal acts provides a clear standard for differentiating improper uses of 
anonymity from proper uses.  To achieve a conviction under this approach, the 
prosecution would have to prove that the defendant purposely assumed anonymity, or 
sought anonymity, for the purpose of committing a crime.”). Id. at 150. 
 453 See Brenner, supra note 184, at 144. 
 454 Id. at 142–43.  
 455 Id. at 144. 
 456 Id. at 147–48. 
 457 See Froomkin, The Clipperchip, supra note 202, at 821–22. 
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Froomkin concludes that the “constitutionality of anti-mask laws 
remains largely unsettled.”458 
2. Why this Treatment Is Not Enough 
There is thus a relatively sparse treatment of anti-mask laws in 
the legal literature on online anonymity.  As indicated above, 
commentators vary in their understanding of Supreme Court case 
law, leaving a significant number of doctrinal holes for anti-mask 
cases to potentially fill. 
For one, there is the question of whether McIntyre and Talley 
protect only high-value political speech.  Two scholars advocate 
recognizing the Doe privilege only “in cases involving political or 
other core speech.”459  The Dendrite cases would indicate that this 
approach is not applied in practice, since courts apply the Doe 
privilege regardless of whether the defendant makes high-value 
political speech.460  The value of the speech, however, might arise 
in the suggested balancing test, where courts might take the value 
of the speech into account when determining the strength of the 
First Amendment protection. 
There is also a question of whether speakers must show a 
likelihood retaliation to establish their right to anonymous 
speech.461  The Dendrite formula presumes that speakers do not 
need to show retaliation to be protected.  This may be in part 
because the focus of the Dendrite test is geared towards 
determining whether the plaintiff’s case is real or strategic.462  It 
does not require the defendant to show a probability of retaliation; 
it requires the plaintiff to show that the suit itself is not 
vindictive.463 
 
 458 Id. at 822–23. 
 459 See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1589–90 (“[L]egislatures and courts should 
recognize a privilege to speak anonymously in cases involving political or other core 
speech; a privilege that can only be overcome upon an exacting showing of need by 
either the State or private litigants.”). 
 460 See supra Part IV.B. 
 461 See supra Part IV.B. 
 462 Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 767–68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001). 
 463 Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 455 (Del. 2005) (applying a good faith standard 
in order to obtain Doe’s identity). 
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More generally, the Dendrite scholarship leaves open the 
question of how the qualified privilege of anonymous speech will 
play out in a nonprocedural context.  Will it matter to the First 
Amendment’s qualified protection of anonymity if anonymity is 
untraceable? 
It is also worth revisiting the anti-mask cases to counter 
potential arguments that anti-mask cases wholeheartedly support 
real-name policies.  Because the dominant anti-mask case is the 
Second Circuit’s recent decision in Kerik,464 it may be tempting for 
scholars to conclude that anti-mask cases provide little to no 
support against real name policies.465  However, as discussed, there 
is significant disagreement in courts over the scope of First 
Amendment protection for mask-wearers, with substantial support 
for an expressive right to anonymity.466  And while legal realism 
certainly does play a role—courts do sometimes cast a cold eye on 
the Ku Klux Klan—there is substantial legal reasoning in these 
cases that can be of value when turning to an analysis of real-name 
policies. 
C. What Anti-Mask Doctrine Adds 
Part III’s analysis of anti-mask case law demonstrated a 
number of points of interest in evaluating online real name 
policies.  The anti-mask cases indicate a judicial atmosphere often 
recognizes that anonymity is a First Amendment right or a right 
closely entwined with free expression.  Despite the breadth of the 
court split in anti-mask cases, there is a generally common 
understanding that anonymity is valuable and should in at least 
 
 464 356 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004). 
465    See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Dangers of Fighting Terrorism with 
Technocommunitarianism: Constitutional Protections of Free Expression, Exploration, 
and Unmonitored Activity in Urban Spaces, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 677, 714 (2005) 
(“The best account of Kerik is that, while the First Amendment does give people a right 
to remain unidentified in many circumstances, it does not give them a right to become 
unidentifiable and untraceable.  This distinction between anonymity and untraceability 
parallels the distinction that exists in the wiretapping context between the right to avoid 
being wire-tapped (without probable cause) and the right to make one's telephone 
facilities ‘wire-tap proof.’”). 
 466 See, e.g., Aryan v. Mackey, 463 F. Supp. 90, 92 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (holding that 
masks worn by protestors were expressive and should be protected under the First 
Amendment). 
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some circumstances be protected as a speech right or as an aspect 
of speech.  Even before McIntyre, anonymity was thus recognized 
as a function that has a nexus with free expression, and as a 
medium for speech that otherwise would not be heard. 
If speakers are required to show harm before their First 
Amendment right to anonymity could be protected, then real name 
policies would be constitutional as applied to many, since not 
every speaker can show harm.  However, the anti-mask cases show 
that a number of courts have felt perfectly comfortable assuming 
that chilling effects will occur, in the absence of a specific showing 
by individuals.467 
Anti-mask cases also instruct us that the state should not be 
permitted to include the nature of anonymity as part of state 
interests, to be balanced against the speaker’s First Amendment 
rights.  As the anti-mask cases show, courts often invoke the 
“intimidating” nature of anonymity as a stand-in for showing that 
the speaker in fact had intent to carry out a threat.468  After 
Virginia v. Black, this cannot be an adequate state interest in the 
absence of a true threat or other real harm.  Thus, courts should be 
cautioned against allowing states to regulate anonymity because it 
is inherently bad, and should look instead to showings of a real, 
concrete state interest.  This counsels towards narrowly tailored 
statutes, supported by a state showing of a concrete compelling 
interest linked to anonymity, rather than a blanket prohibition on 
anonymity generally. 
Anonymity’s inherent functionality should not get in the way 
of protecting against real-name policies.  In the anti-mask cases, 
anonymity’s functionality was itself seen as a distributive method 
cementing the nexus between anonymity and speech, rather than 
exempting anonymity from the coverage of the First 
Amendment.469  Moreover, the Supreme Court’s recent statements 
about elocutionary acts in Doe v. Reed indicate that it will be 
 
 467 See, e.g., Aryan, 462 F. Supp. at 92. 
 468 See, e.g., State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 553 (Ga. 1990). 
 469 See, e.g., Aryan, 462 F. Supp. at 92. 
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reluctant to exempt speech from First Amendment coverage solely 
because that speech also serves a non-expressive function.470 
Wholesale online registration requirements should thus be 
unconstitutional as overly broad.  In large part, I arrive at this 
conclusion out of a concern for unequal distribution of power 
between the state and its citizens.  This rationale is behind the 
Supreme Court’s earlier bans on government licensing and in-
person registration requirements.471 
Where the state has significantly stronger interests, however, a 
narrowly tailored real-name policy might be permissible.  Thus, a 
real-name policy for commercial speech might be constitutional.  
A real-name policy that specifically targeted fraud could be 
constitutional.  For libel cases, however, the fact that outcomes are 
usually in defendants’ favor counsels against crafting an overly 
broad registration requirement in the name of preventing libel, 
sacrificing a First Amendment right for cases that are rarely 
won.472 
Several anti-mask cases suggest that masked speech is just one 
method of speaking, and speakers can be required to express 
themselves through other means than masking, as long as those 
other means are available.  The Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU 
explained that subjecting online regulations to such a time, place, 
and manner analysis is particularly dangerous.  “[O]ne is not to 
have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places 
abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other 
place.”473 
V. REAL MASKS AND REMOTE BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION 
This Article has discussed the implications of case law on real 
masks in the real world for real name policies online.  This Part 
switches tacks.  It turns out that recently developed online Doe 
 
 470 See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2812 (2010). 
 471 See Watchtower Bible v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 162 (2002); Talley v. 
California, 362 U.S. 60, 63, 65 (1960). 
 472 See Froomkin, Silencing John Doe, supra note 12, at 861. 
 473 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (quoting Schneider v. State of N.J. (Town of 
Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)). 
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case law has implications for the regulation of masks in the real 
world. 
Part III identified a significant split in the anti-mask case law.  
Some courts recognize that general anti-mask statutes impinge on 
freedom of expression; others do not.  The convergence of Doe 
case law suggests that courts now may be more willing to 
recognize an underlying right to anonymity that could also be more 
consistently applied offline.474 
Real world anonymity has increasing significance.475  Since 
September 2001, the federal government has increased its efforts to 
compile and employ biometric information, through technologies 
such as facial recognition technology.476  When partnered with 
increased video surveillance, these technologies allow the 
government to “ascertain the identity (1) of multiple people; (2) at 
a distance; (3) in public space; (4) absent notice and consent; and 
(5) in a continuous and on-going manner.”477  In February 2012, 
Congress mandated that the Federal Aviation Administration speed 
up the certification process for law enforcement agencies to obtain 
access to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), colloquially known as 
drones.478  Drones, like other aircraft, are capable of carrying high-
end video cameras; but drones are also significantly less expensive 
than other aircraft, sparking fears of ubiquitous aerial video 
surveillance by the government.479 
Ubiquitous video surveillance coupled with remote biometric 
identification may significantly chill expressive activity in the real 
 
 474 See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 586 F.3d 671, 681 n.10 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. John 
Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 
756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 
U.S. 334, 357 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
475    See Blitz, supra note 465, at 714. 
 476 See Donohue, supra note 9, at 415 (“Facial recognition represents the first of a series 
of next generation biometrics, such as hand geometry, iris, vascular patterns, hormones, 
and gait, which, when paired with surveillance of public space, give rise to unique and 
novel questions of law and policy.”). 
 477 Id. at 415. 
 478 See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 
(2012). 
 479 See M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29 
(2011), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/drone-privacy-catalyst. 
C02_KAMINSKI (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2013  2:41 PM 
2013] REAL MASKS AND REAL NAME POLICIES 891 
world.  While the Supreme Court recently ruled that warrantless 
location tracking through installation of a GPS device onto a car 
violates the Fourth Amendment, earlier Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence on aerial surveillance states that no warrant is 
necessary for aerial surveillance.480 
The Doe jurisprudence teaches us that the First Amendment, in 
addition to the Fourth Amendment, should protect individuals who 
choose to mask themselves in public in order to participate in 
expressive or associational activity.  It should not just be limited to 
people who wear symbolic masks. 
For example, if a stockbroker participates in an Occupy Wall 
Street rally, the First Amendment should protect her decision to 
hide her identity under a Guy Fawkes mask not just because the 
mask is symbolic, but because she concertedly wishes to be 
anonymous.  The Guy Fawkes mask is likely protected by the First 
Amendment under the O’Brien test, having become associated 
with an “anti-establishment message [that] has been embraced by 
the Wall Street occupiers.”481  However, broader First Amendment 
concerns should protect the wearing of any mask, even a 
minimally symbolic one.  Without a mask, the stockbroker’s 
identifiability could provide leverage to those who wish to retaliate 
against her in the future by imperiling her career.482  The concern 
sparked by such identifiability is that “government spying could 
lead to a world in which the government could run a search 
through the database to find something—just one thing—you wish 
it had not seen.”483  This concern could significantly chill 
expressive activity. 
 
 480 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). But see Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 
(1989) (finding that helicopter surveillance at four hundred feer did not constitute a 
search under the Fourth Amendment). 
 481 See Tim Murphy, Guy Fawkes Gets a Last Laugh, 500 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 27 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/fashion/guy-fawkes-
mask-is-big-on-wall-street-and-halloween.html (noting that “it was the ‘hactivist’ 
collective, Anonymous, that imbued [the mask] with real-life symbolism”). 
482    See id. (quoting unemployed stockbroker Sid Hiltunen who attended an Occupy 
Wall Street rally: “If you want to show your support but are afraid you’ll lose your job, 
just wear a mask”). 
 483 Priscilla Smith, Much Ado About Mosaics: How Original Principles Apply to 
Evolving Technology in United States v. Jones, 14 N.C. J. L.& TECH (forthcoming 2013), 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2233561, at 21. 
C02_KAMINSKI (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2013  2:41 PM 
892 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:815 
The Doe case law recognizes that identifiability can chill 
expression, regardless of the symbolism inherent in the mask.  
Anti-mask case law, by contrast, is limited by its frequent focus on 
the O’Brien test.  In anti-mask case law, courts often focus on 
whether the mask is symbolic enough to deserve First Amendment 
protection.  The Doe case law, however, implies a broader 
understanding of anonymity’s expressive implications. 
The Doe subpoena standard establishes a version of First 
Amendment due process for unmaskings.  First Amendment due 
process requires heightened process where First Amendment rights 
are implicated.484  The most famous version of First Amendment 
due process is the ban on prior restraints.  Under the doctrine of 
prior restraints, the government usually may not ban speech before 
a judicial determination that a law has been violated.485  Even 
potentially obscene material, which is not protected by the First 
Amendment, is subject to heightened process protections until a 
court determines that it is in fact obscene.486 
Similarly, the Doe standard requires heightened process 
compared to a usual subpoena, requiring notice to the defendant 
and showing of a prima facie case, and often balancing the First 
Amendment right to anonymity against the strength of the case.  
The Doe standard thus resembles the prior restraint doctrine by 
requiring a showing of some crime or tort before a First-
Amendment-protected activity can be banned.  This suggests that 
expressive anonymity, like other speech, may be banned only 
when a state shows that a distinct crime has been committed, as 
demonstrated by the state or private actor.  The Doe standard thus 
suggests that general anti-mask statutes are not constitutional, 
while more targeted state statutes banning anonymity that enables 
other crimes are acceptable 
Permitting states to ban mask-wearing in the real world 
implicates expressive anonymity, even when the mask is not 
 
 484 See generally  Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and 
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998) (explaining that 
preliminary injunctions are usually considered unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment, but not in the copyright context). 
 485 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722–23 (1931). 
 486 See Freeman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58–60 (1965). 
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symbolic and there is no clear fear of retaliation.  Anonymity may 
be expressive when the mask wearer is attempting to hide her 
identity en route to an associational or expressive event.  
Anonymity may also be expressive when the mask wearer is 
exercising her freedom to peaceably assemble.  Anonymity could 
even be expressive when the mask wearer shows that she is 
wearing the mask specifically in order to be anonymous, using the 
mask to declare to people around her that “I am unknown.”  The 
state should not be permitted to arrest a protestor solely because 
she has covered her face.  The Doe standard suggests, again, that 
the protester may be unmasked only if the state can show evidence 
that she has committed a distinct crime. 
There is a recent example of mask use that specifically 
addresses real world anonymity as an expressive tool.  In early 
2013, artist Adam Harvey created a line of “Stealth Wear” 
clothing, including an “anti-drone hoodie” that masks thermal 
imaging used by drones to spot people.487  The clothing, including 
an “anti-drone scarf,” was created as a commentary on increased 
government use of surveillance technologies.  But if it were to be 
worn in the real world, such a face-covering scarf might violate 
general anti-mask laws because it intentionally conceals the face.  
It does not fall into a customary exception, such as a Halloween 
costume or a costume for a masked ball.  Stealth Wear is clothing 
designed specifically to create the kind of anonymity that people 
could once achieve by walking in a large group through a large 
city.  As surveillance becomes more and more common, anti-mask 
statutes should be looked at with greater scrutiny, and courts 
should apply the First Amendment to them with an eye to the idea 
that masks need not be symbolic speech for mask-wearing to 
constitute expressive anonymity. 
 
 487 See Ryan Gallagher, The Anti-Surveillance Clothing Line that Promises to Thwart 
Cell Tracking and Drones, SLATE (Jan. 11, 2013, 2:57 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/01/11/stealth_wear_adam_harvey_s_clothi
ng_line_safeguards_against_surveillance.html). 
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VI. WHAT THE INTERNET AND FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY HAVE IN 
COMMON 
Ultimately, the core of the expressive right to anonymity is 
about power.  Individuals have more power when they organize as 
an anonymous group against a government than when they act as 
easily identifiable individual targets.  And historically, large 
assemblies in real physical space have functionally enabled most 
of their participants to remain anonymous.488  Anonymous speech 
has also permitted assemblies to start, by protecting channels of 
information distribution that are accessible by and to all people. 
The Supreme Court has not ignored the connection between 
anonymity and assembly.489  In Talley, the Court noted that “a 
requirement of registration in order to make a public speech would 
seem generally incompatible with an exercise of the rights of free 
speech and free assembly.”490  Assembly thrives on spontaneity, 
and is fed by particular forms of communication, both of which are 
protected by anonymity.  The Talley Court relatedly noted the 
historic value of the medium of pamphleteering.491  Pamphlets 
have been “historic weapons in the defense of liberty,”492 part of a 
right to express oneself in the street in an orderly fashion by 
“handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word.”493  
Pamphleteering is a way of communicating ideas to the broadest 
possible group, in a public space, and as such is both a precursor to 
assembly and entwined with assembly in public spaces. 
This historical metaphor—of anonymous handbills passed out 
to one’s peers in the street—is highly salient online.  The Internet 
 
488   See Blitz, supra note 465, at 679 (describing the historical “unparalleled individual 
freedom one gains in urban anonymity”). 
489   Blitz, supra note 465, at 684 (explaining that “modern First Amendment law places 
meaningful limits on the control that governmental authorities may exercise over streets, 
parks, and other public spaces central to urban life.  It also stringently protects the 
anonymity that individuals may retain in such public spaces—for example, when they 
distribute unsigned leaflets or present controversial views to strangers on a public street.  
These limits suggest there are constitutional boundaries on the extent to which 
governments may transform urban spaces (and other public spaces) in which their 
citizens live”). 
490    Id. 
 491 See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960). 
 492 Lovell v. City of Griffin, Ga., 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938). 
 493 Jamison v. State, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943). 
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can be an empowering technology for individuals who wish to 
gather groups, whether virtual or real, to criticize the powerful 
majority, since the broadcasting ability online is in the hands of 
anybody who posts.494  After decades of big media, the Internet is 
“capable of becoming a radically democratizing tool” because it 
offers “cheap one-to-many communication.”495  As one author 
noted, the “promise of the Internet is empowerment: it empowers 
ordinary individuals with limited financial resources to ‘publish’ 
their views on matters of public concern . . . allowing more 
democratic participation in public discourse.”496  From a cultural 
democratic view of the First Amendment, then, the fact that 
anonymous speech is taking place online should afford it 
significant First Amendment protection.497 
The Supreme Court has in other places linked anonymity to 
populist distribution methods.  In Watchtower, the Court 
emphasized the democratic nature of the particular method of 
distribution, finding that past cases “discuss extensively the 
historical importance of door-to-door canvassing and 
pamphleteering as vehicles for the dissemination of ideas,”498 a 
method that is “essential to the poorly financed causes of little 
people.”499  The Court found that door-to-door anonymous 
pamphleteering was worth protecting as a particularly valuable 
avenue for speech by the non-elite. 
The same argument could be made about online speech: it is 
one of the few avenues of distribution of expression that is open to 
“little people,” rather than controlled by big media conglomerates.  
In recognizing the significance of protecting a particular 
distributive method because of its accessibility to non-elites, the 
Court in Watchtower laid the groundwork for a heightened—or at 
least equal—protection for online forums.  It also laid the 
 
 494 Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 408 (stating that “given the ability to 
broadcast messages widely using the Internet, anonymous e-mail may become the 
modern replacement of the anonymous handbill”). 
 495 Id. at 412. 
 496 Lidsky, Silencing John Doe, supra note 36, at 860–61. 
 497 Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 
101, 101 (2009). 
 498 Watchtower Bible v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 162 (2002). 
 499 Id. at 163 (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144–46 (1943)). 
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groundwork for scrutiny of how anonymity interacts with access to 
one-to-many communication in the real world. 
Anonymity thus has played and continues to play a significant 
role in both online and offline assembly and the related topic of 
one-to-many communication.  The historical use of anonymity to 
protect pamphleteers and door-to-door canvassers should show 
how much political organization benefits from protection for 
anonymity.  The rise of the hactivist group Anonymous in both the 
offline and online worlds demonstrates this continuing link 
between mass information dissemination, assembly, and 
anonymity both online and offline.500 
CONCLUSION 
Anti-mask case law provides insights about online real name 
policies; and Doe case law gives us insights onto anti-mask laws.  
The two bodies of law reinforce each other, suggesting that there is 
a longer judicial history about and more robust judicial 
development of protection for anonymity than many scholars 
believe exists.  Courts may thus be more amenable than previously 
suggested to protecting anonymity as a way of protecting free 
expression and association.  This amenability is particularly 
important as both online and offline expression becomes 
increasingly traceable, and states attempt to reinforce that 
traceability through law.  Pure anonymity, both physical and 
virtual, will become increasingly expressive as citizens choose to 
employ it specifically to enable themselves to communicate and 
associate unobserved. 
 
 
 500 See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, The Soul of the New Hactivist, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 17 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/sunday-review/the-soul-of-the-new-
hacktivist.html. 
